China and Japan's strategic nuclear relationship by LaBauve, Jeffrey W.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2009-09
China and Japan's strategic nuclear relationship
LaBauve, Jeffrey W.






















 Thesis Advisor:   C. Twomey 
 Second Reader: A. Miller 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
September 2009 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  China and Japan’s Strategic Nuclear Relationship 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Jeffrey LaBauve 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943–5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
While China and Japan individually have been the focus of tremendous study, until recently it was not necessary to 
compare their nuclear relationship.  The advent of Japan’s ballistic missile defenses has offered a unique twist on the 
traditional study between two nuclear powers.  This thesis examines each country’s strategic situation in this new 
light and maintains that the same theories about strategic interaction still hold. Lawrence Freedman’s theory of 
“general deterrence” is particularly relevant; his theory finds two actors in conflict will react to opposing actors’ force 
structure and policies despite their belief that there is no military solution to their situation. 
 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
79 
14. SUBJECT TERMS   
Deterrence, Japan, China, Nuclear, Missile Defense  

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
CHINA AND JAPAN’S STRATEGIC NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP 
 
Jeffrey W. LaBauve 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., Tulane University, 2008 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 
























Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD 
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
While China and Japan individually have been the focus of tremendous study, 
until recently, it was not necessary to compare their nuclear relationship.  The advent of 
Japan’s ballistic missile defenses has offered a unique twist on the traditional study 
between two nuclear powers.  This thesis examines each country’s strategic situation in 
this new light and maintains that the same theories about strategic interaction still hold. 
Lawrence Freedman’s theory of “general deterrence” is particularly relevant; his theory 
finds two actors in conflict will react to opposing actors’ force structure and policies 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii




C. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................4 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES.............................................................8 
II. STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES, POLICIES, AND PERCEPTIONS FOR 
JAPAN ..........................................................................................................................9 
A.  INTRODUCTION............................................................................................9 
B.  JAPANESE NUCLEAR POLICY................................................................10 
C.  DESCRIPTION OF JAPAN’S VIRTUAL NUCLEAR WEAPON ..........13 
1.  Nuclear Energy...................................................................................13 
2.  Fissile Material ...................................................................................15 
3.  Delivery Systems ................................................................................17 
4.  Command, Control, and Strategic Warning ...................................19 
D.  MISSILE DEFENSE .....................................................................................22 
E.  JAPAN’S NUCLEAR STRATEGY .............................................................25 
III. STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES, POLICIES AND PERCEPTIONS FOR 
CHINA ........................................................................................................................31 
A.  INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................31 
B.  DESCRIPTION OF CHINESE NUCLEAR FORCES ..............................31 
1.  Ballistic Missile Submarines .............................................................31 
2.  Strategic Bombers..............................................................................32 
3.  Land-based Ballistic Missiles ............................................................33 
C.  CHINA’S NUCLEAR STRATEGY.............................................................35 
D.  RESPONSES TO THE JAPANESE BMD SYSTEM.................................37 
E. CHINA’S NUCLEAR FUTURE ..................................................................39 
IV. THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AND GENERAL DETERRENCE 
THEORY ....................................................................................................................41 
A.  INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................41 
B.  HISTORY OF DETERRENCE THEORY .................................................42 
C.  DESCRIPTION OF DETERRENCE THEORY ........................................42 
D.  GENERAL DETERRENCE AND THE SINO-JAPANESE 
RELATIONSHIP...........................................................................................44 
E.  MISSILE DEFENSE’S EFFECT ON DETERRENCE .............................49 
F.  MILITARY MODERNIZATION EFFECT ON DETERRENCE............51 
G.  WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS...................................................................53 
H.  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................55 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................57 





























I would like to acknowledge all my friends and family who listened to me go on 
about this for four years.  Their encouragement has been invaluable.   
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
                                                
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
In 1922, five great powers met to stop an arms race by mutually agreeing to 
restrict the number of battleships and prevent any ensuing escalation.1  Decades later, the 
two superpowers of the world agreed in the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) to 
limit their nuclear weapons in order to stop a dangerous arms race and avert global 
thermonuclear war.  Where war’s currency was once battleships, it had now become 
strategic missiles.2  A security dilemma created both of these situations. Each state 
attempted to increase its own security with respect to a second state, the unintended 
consequences of which resulted in the second state responding in kind, actually 
decreasing the first state’s security.  A similar situation is present today in the modern 
world’s longest lasting antagonistic relationship.  China and Japan continue to refuse to 
address the core security issues between them and are instead fielding missiles against 
each other. 
China’s recent development and fielding of the DF-31A missile improves the 
range of its strategic forces, provides for possible multiple independent reentry vehicle 
(MIRV) capability of up to three warheads, and may be equipped with penetration decoy 
aids to defeat missile defense. In comparison, Japan newly tested the SM-3 in December 
2007. The SM-3 is the most technologically advanced missile of the day, with the ability 
to destroy a ballistic missile in space.   These recent developments in the strategic 
capabilities of Japan are indicative of a new, emerging strategic relationship between 
China and Japan. The strategic balance between the two countries is difficult to ascertain 
due to the complexities and differences in weapon systems employed by both sides. 
China views the nascent nuclear ability of Japan as real. Japan views China’s 
modernization of its military and nuclear arsenal as threatening to regional stability and 
 
1 The Washington Naval Treaty, or the “Five-Power Treaty” limited the naval forces of each country 
and is generally believed to have delayed the Second World War. 
2 This situation is initially compared in Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and 
Arms Control in the Missile Age (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967). 
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to itself.  Japan’s new ballistic missile defense system complicates the relationship by 
devaluing China’s nuclear deterrent.  Both China and Japan are attempting to increase 
their own security, but in responding to each other’s actions, they are only provoking a 
decrease in their own security.  Each side views the other with political suspicion as 
potential military opponents.  
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the strategic relationship between China 
and Japan. The new strategic tension generated by the Japanese ballistic missile defense 
(BMD) concerns China more than any other power, but how China views the emerging 
strategic balance remains unclear.  In principle, deterrence theory should govern how 
both nations relate to each other.  This thesis will ask if it does.    
B. IMPORTANCE 
The strategic tension between China and Japan has not attracted a great deal of 
attention. Certainly, on individual issues, authors have assessed the relationship between 
the two countries.3 A comprehensive examination of the nuclear and strategic balance 
however, has not been attempted. This thesis attempts to fill that gap. It summarizes the 
strategic capabilities of both China and Japan and describes the policies and perceptions 
fueling those capabilities. This strategic tension is reminiscent of a brewing cold war with 
Asian characteristics. In that regard, a relationship between two countries whose security 
perceptions are hostile and who have made calculated decisions to avoid conflict instead 
of coexisting peacefully defines a cold war. Although there have been few if any cases of 
immediate deterrence between China and Japan for decades, both countries are engaging 
in general deterrence.4   
 
3 Recent analyses of the changing security relationship between China and Japan are: Peter J. 
Katzenstein, “Rethinking Asian Security: A Case for Analytical Eclecticism” in Rethinking Security in East 
Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency ed. J.J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), 1–33; Peter J. Katzenstein, “Beyond Japanization: Regionmaking in East 
Asia” in Beyond Japan: East Asian Regionalism ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2006); David Shambaugh, Power Shift: China & Asia’s New Dynamics 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). 
4 Freedman defines immediate deterrence as occurring during times of crisis when one side is 
mounting an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation to prevent it. 
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According to Lawrence Freedman,5   
At times of general deterrence, each side’s force structure will be shaped 
by a variety of economic, technical, cultural, and political factors, as well 
as an assessment of the other’s force structure. General deterrence 
involves an institutionalized perception by a state that, despite continuing 
antagonism, it should not expect to be able to resolve its disputes with 
another state by military means. 
This thesis identifies the strategic assets both sides possess, the manner in which 
these forces interact, and the institutionalized strategy each state deploys to assess the 
validity of a picture of the two countries engaged in what Freedman defines as general 
deterrence. The resulting analysis reveals both countries are engaged in an antagonistic 
relationship in which neither country believes it can currently solve.  What follows 
encompasses the economic, technical, cultural and political factors and assessments of 
each side’s force structure. In essence, this thesis is a case study for general deterrence 
theory based on the relationship between Japan and China. 
This study is important because deterrence literature extensively studies common 
strategic relationships such as that between the United States and the former Soviet 
Union, but the possibility of nuclear war is not limited to nuclear warfare between only 
nuclear powers. The new dimension of defensive strategic capabilities not only adds 
more complexity to current strategic relationships; it also broadens the number of 
strategic relationships to include “defense heavy” countries like Japan and Korea.6 The 
literature has not given the strategic relationship between China and Japan much thought, 
but even a cursory glance reveals that it now deserves attention. No other countries have 
the brutal history and simmering animosity these two countries have, and no security 
relationship is more important for East Asia than the one between China and Japan. Their 
relationship is critically important to peace in the East Asian region. For decades, the 
nuclear weapon was the only military edge China possessed against Japan; Japan’s effort 
to develop BMD threatens that edge. 
 
5 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity Press: 2004), 42. 
6 The 2002 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review expanded the traditional definition of the nuclear triad by 
adding strategic defensive capabilities and precision non-nuclear strike forces. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
At present, no literature directly assesses Sino-Japanese strategic relationship, 
although there is much supporting literature that creates a framework for such study. The 
Japanese nuclear weapon issue is divided into two camps: those who believe Japan’s 
search to become a normal country may also result in a nuclear Japan and those who 
believe it is impossible to conceive of a nuclear Japan.7 Matake Kamiya states that 
numerous technological and political problems prevent Japan from developing nuclear 
weapons in the near future.8  Benjamin Self and Jeffrey Thompson support this argument 
by detailing the intent, capabilities, and nonnuclear components that show that Japan is 
not preparing for a nuclear breakout.9 Their argument, however, has problems because 
each area Self and Thompson covers proves only how capable the Japanese could be at 
developing a nuclear weapon. Self and Thompson admit to as much in their conclusion, 
but maintain that Japan has no expertise in bomb or warhead design, bomber technology, 
no suitable submarine technology (which is patently false), and, most importantly, no 
institutionalization in its command and control.   
Japan does have weaknesses in each of these areas, but recent changes in Japan’s 
military policy, force structure, and investment in BMD reflect a need for a re-assessment 
in Japan’s nuclear capability.  In the same book, Katsuhisa Furukawa shows the evolving 
debate in Japan concerning the nuclear option.10 He concludes that pragmatic discussion 
of the nuclear option and Japan’s strategic interests is healthy and that these interests are 
changing with Japan’s security environment.  Therefore, a domestic re-evaluation of 
traditional Japanese positions on the nuclear issue is worthwhile.  For instance, Furukawa 
 
7 Jennifer M. Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy,” 
International Security, Vol. 29, No.1 (Summer 2004), 92–121. 
8 Matake Kamiya, “Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon?” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, 
No.1 (Winter 2002). 
9 Benjamin Self and Jeffrey Thompson, “Nuclear Energy, Space Launch Vehicles, and Advanced 
Technology: Japan’s Prospects for a Nuclear Breakout,” in Japan’s Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and 
Policy in the 21st Century, ed. Jeffrey Thompson and Benjamin Self (Washington, The Henry L. Stimson 
Center, 2003), 148–176. 
10 Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Nuclear Option, Arms Control and Extended Deterrence: In Search of a New 
Framework for Japan’s Nuclear Policy,” in Japan’s Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 
21st Century, ed. Jeffrey Thompson and Benjamin Self (Washington, The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), 
95–147. 
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touches on the deterrence value of the nuclear option with regards to China, but does not  
fully integrate China’s perceptions into Japan’s strategic position.  This is important 
because Japan’s strategic position has changed dramatically with the introduction of a 
missile defense system.   
Missile defense is the key strategic issue.  It is Japan’s first foray into an 
independent strategic asset. As Japan is not technically a nuclear state, this aspect of 
Japan’s strategic orientation is interesting and revealing. But thus far, experts limit 
discussions to its implications for U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation and hardly, if 
ever, view the situation through a bilateral relationship between China and Japan.11  
Christopher Hughes lays out the discussion of these issues in Japan and the implications 
for the Sino-Japanese relationship, but he and the Japanese analysts he cites dismiss 
Japan’s nuclear option as highly unlikely.12  They fail to integrate the missile defense 
issue and Japan’s virtual nuclear state as a singular strategic threat.  Japan may be an 
example of a new type of strategic threat: a state not only capable of creating a strategic 
arsenal in months, but also of maintaining a defensive capability. Most government 
thinktanks and other international security institutions all take note of China’s negative 
reaction to Japan’s military modernization and BMD.13 Clearly, for them, it is a simple 
issue. China is content with Japan’s lower-tier BMD system and worries that Japan’s may 
 
11 Umemoto Tetsuya, “Japan–U.S. Cooperation in Ballistic Missile Defense” (James Martin Center for 
Non-Proliferation Studies, 2002), available online at cns.miis.edu/pubs/; Internet; accessed 28 February 
2009; Adam Ward, “Japan’s New Defense Posture: Towards Power Projection, IISS Strategic Comments, 
(International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2004), available from www.iiss.org/stratcom; 
Internet; accessed 20 July 2006. 
12 Christopher Hughes, “Sino–Japanese Relations and Ballistic Missile Defense”  CGSR Working 
Paper 64/01 (Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation: The University of Warwick. 
January 2001); available from http://www.csgr.org; Internet; accessed 6 June 2009.  
13 Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “China’s Opposition to US Missile Defense Programs,” 
(Monterey Institute for International Studies, 2006); available from http://cns.miis.edu/research 
/china/chinamd.htm; Internet; accessed 24 October 2008; Eric McVadon, “Chinese Reactions to New U.S. 
Initiatives on Missile Defense,” in China’s Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic 
Missiles and Conventional Capabilities ed. Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel (Strategic Studies 
Institute, Army War College, 2002); Brad Roberts, “China and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955 to 2002 and 
Beyond” (Alexandria: Institute of Defense Analysis, 2003); Adam Ward, “Japan’s New Defense Posture: 
Towards Power Projection, IISS Strategic Comments (International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 
2004); available from http://www.iiss.org/stratcom/; Internet; accessed 20 July 2006; IISS Strategic 
Comments, “The Military Balance,” in Japan’s New Defense Posture: Towards Power Projection 
(International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2004); available from http://www.iiss.org/stratcom; 
Internet; accessed 20 July 2006. 
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deploy its Aegis mid-tier system to protect Taiwan. Although China has been relatively 
silent on this issue recently, this may be due to recent technological advancements in 
Chinese missile technology.  Brad Roberts’s study of missile defense for the Institute of 
Defense Analysis is the most detailed in the field and he offers a very compelling paper 
on the Chinese evolution of thought concerning BMD.14  He takes a thoroughly realist 
position, pointing out that China must ensure its second-strike capability, must respond to 
shifts in the Sino-U.S. strategic relationship, and must also ensure the stable maintenance 
in global power distribution. Robert’s belief in China’s realist approach may be 
reassuring to U.S. policy makers, but it does little to explain China’s vehement reaction 
to Japan’s involvement in BMD research.   
The nuclear debate in China started before it tested its first nuclear bomb.  A few 
authors believe the debate about whether the bomb was useful at all shaped the present 
Chinese policies of no first use and minimum deterrence.15  The Chinese have debated 
minimum deterrence versus limited deterrence at least for the past decade.16 Numerous 
China analysts have posited that a shift to limited deterrence capability may still be a long 
way off. According to Johnston, “While the data on extant Chinese operational nuclear 
capabilities, targeting and launch doctrine are extremely poor, it is fairly safe to say that 
Chinese capabilities come nowhere near the level required by the concept of limited 
deterrence.”17  
The most recent assessment of China’s deterrence strategy is Jeffrey Lewis’s 
study, “The Minimum Means of Reprisal,” which postulates that the Chinese perception 
centers on a belief that nuclear weapons provide more of a security benefit than Western 
 
14 Brad Roberts, “China and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond” Alexandria: 
Institute of Defense Analysis. September 2003. 
15 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1991); Jeffrey Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security in the Nuclear Age 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007); Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, 
Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2000). 
16 Paul Godwin and John Schulz, “Arming the Dragon for the 21st Century: China’s Defense 
Modernization Program,” Arms Control Today (December 1993): 6; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, 
China’s Strategic Seapower (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). 
17 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence 
Versus Multilateral Arms Control,” China Quarterly (June 1996): 552–558. 
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nations believe.18 This different view of nuclear strategy results in a different need for 
capability. Lewis concludes that the Chinese are more willing to sacrifice offensive 
capability for greater political control and lower economic costs. And like Jeffrey Lewis, 
Sun Xiangli (2005) believes China has maintained a consistent framework of nuclear 
policy that is based on a clear understanding of the nature of nuclear weapons.19  The 
point being China’s psychological belief in the different nature of nuclear weapons 
ultimately drives strategy and capability.  
But there are stronger realist views that China’s nuclear strategy is not one of 
“minimum” deterrence but is focused on a capability sufficient to meet current national 
security needs as Evan Medeiros argues.20 The evidence lies in the fact that China is 
working to improve the survivability of its nuclear forces and to defeat missile defense 
systems.21  Avery Goldstein addresses the broader neo-realist perspective by stating that 
Chinese grand strategy is a calculated decision to reduce the risk that the world perceives 
a rising China as a threat that must be countered.22 What neither Goldstein and Medeiros 
or Xiangli and Lewis address is how Chinese strategy is affected by the new Japanese 
missile defense strategy and its changing nuclear option.23 And moreover, there have 
been no case-study assessments of whether Freedman’s new idea of constructivist 
deterrence theory explains Chinese developments and actions.   
This thesis will pick up where these authors have left off, using the concepts of 
China’s modernization and Beijing’s belief in the psychological effects of nuclear 
 
18 Lewis, Minimum Means of Reprisal, 11. 
19 Sun Xiangli, “Analysis of China’s Nuclear Strategy,” China Security 1 (Autumn 2005), 23–27. 
20 Evan S. Medeiros, “Evolving Nuclear Doctrine,” in China’s Nuclear Future, ed Paul J. Bolt and 
Albert S. Willner (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 39–78. 
21 Godwin and Shulz, Arming the Dragon; George Perkovich, “The Nuclear and Security Balance,” in 
Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding, eds., The India–China Relationship: Rivalry and Engagement 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004); Phillip Saunders and Jing Dong Yuan, “Strategic Force 
Modernization,” in China’s Nuclear Future, ed Paul J. Bolt and Albert S. Willner (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2006) 79–118. 
22 Goldstein, Deterrence and Security; Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand 
Strategy and International Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
23 Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Honolulu: University Press of 
the Pacific, 2005); Gu Guoliang, “Missile proliferation and Missile Defense in North–East Asia,” 
Disarmament Forum, North East Asian Security 2005, no. 2. 
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weapons on deterrence.  This thesis will ultimately use Lawrence Freedman’s new 
constructivist ideas of deterrence to describe the Sino-Japanese relationship. 
By reviewing Japan’s nuclear and missile defense capabilities, evaluating the 
current Japanese debate on nuclear weapon policy, and drawing conclusions on Japan’s 
possible nuclear strategy, a much clearer picture of Japan’s deterrence posture and its 
effects on its relationship with China will emerge.  Then, an examination of the Chinese 
nuclear capability with a Japanese paradigm in mind and its responses to the Japanese 
ballistic missile defense system will illuminate China’s policy of minimum deterrence in 
terms of its affect on Japan’s strategic decision making.  Finally, using Lawrence 
Freedman’s deterrence theory, this thesis describes the Sino-Japanese nuclear relationship 
in terms of social norms and internalized boundaries.  Ultimately, the Sino-Japanese 
nuclear relationship is best explained not by balances of power or international 
institutions, but by commonly agreed-upon social norms that have been established over 
decades.  It is these core issues and analysis of the nuclear relationship’s boundaries that 
best predicts whether future decisions will lead to conflict. 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
The methodology used in this thesis is primarily a factual analysis of the current 
capabilities, using general deterrence theory to describe the international relationship. 
The underlying assumption is that a nation’s military capabilities say much about its 
intentions and strategy. Sources include official documents from both Japan and China 
concerning nuclear assets.  This thesis analyzes statements by Japanese and Chinese 
officials on the orientation of strategic assets, including commentary on these sources, to 
determine the strategic orientation of each country. Deterrence theory is used to describe 
and to build upon the strategic framework outlined by the Chinese and Japanese sources. 
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II. STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES, POLICIES, AND 
PERCEPTIONS FOR JAPAN 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Japanese beliefs regarding the nature of security competition run deep.  Prior to 
the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the caste system divided Japanese society. And in many 
respects Japan still is a socially divided country.  The Japanese military and conservative 
establishment see themselves as defenders and guardians of traditional Japanese life, 
culture and values. And one of the critical lessons for the conservatives is the story of two 
men prepared to start a battle to prevent surrender. From the Hagakure, Yamamoto 
writes:  
When a castle is being surrendered, as long as there are one or two men 
within it who are determined to hold on, the defending forces will not be 
of one accord, and in the end no one will hold the castle.  In the taking of 
the castle, if when the man who is to receive it approaches and the one or 
two men who are determined to hold on to it lightly fire on him from the 
shadows, the man will be alarmed and the battle will be on.  In such a 
case, even though it is unwillingly done, the castle will have to be 
stormed.  This is called being force to besiege a castle by those besieged.24 
The resulting belief is that as long as there are a few resolute defenders in the 
whole of Japan, they will be properly prepared for any attack and surrender will never be 
necessary.  Conservatives in Japan retain these beliefs down to the present. One of the 
reasons they so strongly endorse a nuclear capability is to ensure their country is capable 
of defending itself despite the public’s aversion to war and its devices. In policy, Japan 
maintains its nonnuclear status; but just enough doubt remains legally for Japan to 
embrace nuclear weapons should it be necessary. In capability, this means the research 
Japan conducts in nuclear technology can be used not only for peaceful means but also 
for use in wartime. Japan would only use such weapons when absolutely necessary to 
defend the country despite the general public’s attitude in a conflict.  These two men with 
 
24 Tsunetomo Yamamoto, Hagakure, trans. William Scott Wilson (New York: Stackpole Books, 
2002), 140. 
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nationalistic spirit are ready to defend Japan or even start wars to prevent the humiliation 
of their country.  Conservative factions in Japan promote robust capabilities in each sub-
area of Japan’s “virtual” nuclear capability and missile defense system.  These are 
enhanced while the overall demeanor of Japan is of one committed to a non-nuclear state.  
But the details reveal a different picture of Japan. 
This thesis argues that Japan views China in an antagonistic security relationship, 
which has resulted in the implicit effort by the Japanese to maintain a “virtual” nuclear 
capability. Further, if Japan does decide to develop nuclear weapons, then it is capable of 
fielding a force in a surprisingly short amount of time.  
This thesis will support this argument by starting with Japanese policy concerning 
nuclear weapons and how the policy is not as restrictive as it initially appears.  Then we 
will deal with each sub-area of the requirements for building and fielding a nuclear 
weapon.  First, Japan’s pursuit of resource independence has coincidentally provided 
Japan with a highly technological and proficient source for nuclear weapons material.  
Second, is the requirement to develop a method to deliver the weapon. Third, Japan 
requires a basic intelligence system to recognize and classify nuclear threats as well as 
field a capable command and control system. Lastly will be a concise evaluation of 
Japan’s missile defense system and how it affects Japan’s strategic capability.  Finally, 
the conclusion will consist of an assessment of Japan’s possible nuclear strategy and the 
implications on the aspect of Japan’s strategic deterrence.  
In each of these areas, this thesis will illustrate the existence of a careful, 
independent and deliberate intention to ensure Japan has the future choice to develop 
nuclear weapons.  This development “threat” plays a part in Japan’s unspoken nuclear 
deterrent strategy.  The other part is played by Japan’s missile defense system.  
B.  JAPANESE NUCLEAR POLICY 
No laws explicitly restrain Japan from developing nuclear weapons. The literature 
often cites Article 9, Chapter 2 of the Japanese constitution as the source restraining 
Japan from developing nuclear weapons: “Land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war 
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potential, will never be maintained.”25 But, in reality, Japan does field forces with 
undeniable war potential and will reinterpret the Japanese constitution as necessary in the 
development and employment of weapon systems.  Japan originally deployed the Self-
Defense Force with the specific goal of providing for Japan’s internal defense.  But even 
these forces have slowly expanded the reach and scope of their operations in Japan’s slow 
but deliberate “normalization.”26 Other less notable changes in the structure of the Self 
Defense agencies illustrate Japan’s current commitment to re-enter the world stage as a 
normal country.27 In the current Japanese interpretation of Article 9, development of 
weapons employed in the country’s defense is allowed. But the purchase, development, 
or fielding of weapons that could be used to attack foreign sovereign territory is 
restricted.  Even though this interpretation has broadened considerably throughout the 
years, it still has prevented Japan from purchasing land attack cruise missiles (i.e., 
Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles [TLAMs]).  In each case of purchasing weapons and 
employing them, Japan looks at the political ramifications on Article 9 and the intent 
behind its wording. 
Japan has passed other laws that seemingly prevent the development of nuclear 
weapons. The Japanese Diet passed a law in 1955 stating, “The research, development, 
and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes” (Atomic Energy 
 
25 The Constitution of Japan, art. 9, ch. 2. 
26 This deliberate normalization is best illustrated by Japan’s participation in multilateral operations 
and exercises.  Japan has traditionally only participated in multilateral events like RIMPAC with the 
understanding it communicates with only the United States. This has changed recently with the Indian, 
Japanese, and U.S. multilateral exercise in Malabar in 2007, followed by multilateral exercises with the 
United States and Australia and the United States and Korea.  And the 2009 deployment of JMSDF ships to 
the Indian Ocean to join the multilateral task force against piracy not a sentence.  
27 Japan’s Self Defense Force has undergone profound changes in 2007 with Japan’s Defense Agency 
(JDA) became a full cabinet ministry with the title of Ministry of Defense (MOD) . In addition the Joint 
Staff Office (JSO) has been created to mimic the advantages of a joint force in U.S. doctrine. In 2008, the 
Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force reorganized its structure to allow for quicker command and control 
by the JSO and Commander-in-Chief Self-Defense Fleet (Kaiju Jeitai/CINCSDFLT). And in 2006, the 
naming convention for Japanese naval ships was changed from Japanese Defense Ship (JDS) to simply 
Japanese Ship (JS).  These seemingly individual innocuous changes taken together form a picture of a 
normalizing country. 
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Basic Law, 1955).28 Still, even this law does not explicitly prevent Japan from 
developing nuclear weapons for the country’s defense, which might be interpreted as 
consistent with “peaceful use.” The closest preventive policy is a 1968 Diet resolution, 
the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” which states that Japan shall neither possess nor 
manufacture nuclear weapons and nor shall it permit their introduction into Japanese 
territory. Although these and other policy statements affirm Japan’s commitment to 
remaining a nuclear weapon-free state, the diet resolution is not legally binding and has 
comparatively the same weight as a congressional resolution; therefore there is nothing to 
overturn and as a consequence nothing preventing Japan from developing nuclear 
weapons. A similar issue was the recent revelation that the Japanese expressly turned a 
blind eye towards U.S. deployments of nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 60s.  Japan’s 
signatory status to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty presents a problem, but every 
country retains the right to opt out of the treaty given three months’ notice, as the North 
Korean’s have shown repeatedly.   All of these policies designate Japan as a non-nuclear 
state, but all of these policies can be overturned. If the Japanese populace and world 
opinion is given the right security environment and a positive “spin” on the reasons for 
such an action there is nothing that could stop Japan from developing and fielding nuclear 
weapons. 
Japanese right-wing activists have maintained that even nuclear weapons are 
defensive. In fact, recent statements by the Japanese government reaffirm this position. 
Responding to earlier statements by the Defense Agency that Japan will retain the legal 
possibility of developing nuclear weapons in the future, the prime minister of Japan, 
Koizumi, stated, “It is significant that although we could have them, we don’t.”29 Current 
laws do not prevent Japan from developing nuclear weapons. Furthermore, these recent 
statements reflect a trend towards greater leniency for the development of nuclear 
weapons. A small, powerful minority in Japan associated with the conservative wing of 
the Liberal Democratic Party has kept alive this small but important possibility. 
 
28 Japan. Japanese Diet. Atomic Energy Basic Law (1955); available from http://www.jaea.go.jp 
/jnc/kaihatu/hukaku/english/atomiclaw.htm; Internet; accessed 20 July 2006. The Atomic Energy Basic 
Law sets out that Japan has the right to pursue research in the nuclear field as long as this research is for 
peaceful purposes only. 
29 Joji Sakurai, “Koizumi Clarifies Japan’s Nuclear Stance,” Associated Press, 10 June 10 2002. 
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C.  DESCRIPTION OF JAPAN’S VIRTUAL NUCLEAR WEAPON 
Experts have referred to Japan as a virtual nuclear power. This nascent capability 
requires a more specific and detailed examination of each component required for a 
viable nuclear deterrent. A country must have the facilities to produce nuclear material, 
an inventory of fissile material, a warhead delivery system, and an effective command 
system to make the deterrent viable.  
1.  Nuclear Energy 
The Japanese virtual nuclear weapon capability starts with the facilities Japan 
maintains for its nuclear energy self-sufficiency. It is no surprise that to produce nuclear 
weapons the most important requirement is the manufacture of fissile material. Without 
outside assistance, most countries spend decades developing the necessary expertise and 
facilities to create weaponized material. In Japan, the existing highly technological 
nuclear energy program would make it easy to develop nuclear weapons.30 The ultimate 
impact of which is to strengthen Japan’s status as a “virtual” nuclear power.  Not 
something that can be developed overnight, Japan dedicated decades of research to a 
solution to the Japan’s dependency on outside energy sources. As with most problems, 
Japan has sought to address its overseas energy dependency through technological 
advancements. Japan’s fast breeder reactors (FBRs) and plutonium-uranium mixed oxide 
(MOX) fuel processing programs is an effort to rid itself of foreign energy dependency.31 
The unintended consequence  results in a large domestic stockpile of nuclear material.32 
Unintended or not, this strengthens Japan’s virtual nuclear weapon status.  
 
30 For a detailed analysis on converting the reactor class plutonium for weapons, J.C. Mark, 
“Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium,” Science and Global Security, Vol.4, No. 1, 1993, 111–
128. 
31 Tatsujiro Suzuki, “Global Nuclear Future: A Japanese Perspective,” (Melbourne: Nautilus Institute, 
2006) available from http://www.globalcollab.org/Nautilus/australia/apsnet/reports/2006/0601t-suzuki/; 
Internet; accessed 6 May 2009. 
32 Gavan Mccormack, Client State: Japan in the American Embrace (London: Verso, 2007), 182–183; 
Self and Thompson, “Nuclear Energy,” 166. 
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In 1977, Japan started the one of the first research nuclear reactors to generate 
MOX fuel.33 MOX fuel is an alternative to the low-enriched uranium normally used in 
nuclear reactors in which the spent fuel from nuclear reactors is recycled and mixed with 
depleted uranium. Used reactor material must be reprocessed. Although a majority of 
reprocessing this material into MOX takes place overseas, Japan began operating a small 
reprocessing site in 2007 to maintain develop a domestic MOX processing facility.34 The 
reprocessing site can also serve as a weapons-grade material reprocessing site. However, 
even reprocessing sites require nuclear material. The FBRs that produce more nuclear 
material than they consume are the solution to this problem. 
Without an indigenous supply of nuclear material, Japan relies on the success of 
its FBRs to generate or breed more fuel than it consumes, creating a domestic closed 
cycle for reactor fuel and, therefore, energy self-sufficiency.35 The Japanese government 
has given Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) the goal to advance the current Japanese 
FBR program beyond its experimental and prototype reactors with the construction of a 
demonstration reactor by 2025 and commercial reactors by 2050.36 FBR technologies can 
be used to extract weapons-grade plutonium; they may also be used as alternatives to 
MOX reprocessing centers for sources of fissile material.  It is not clear what additional 
 
33 The World Nuclear Association has a detailed factual history and current status of every nuclear 
country. Japan’s nuclear energy program can be found in World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in 
Japan, May 2009; available from http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf79.html; Internet; accessed 6 June 
2009. 
34 Lawrence M. Lidsky and Marvin M Miller, “Nuclear Power and Energy Security.” A Revised 
Strategy for Japan,” (Melbourne: Nautilus Institute, 1998); “Weapons of Mass Destruction: Tokai,” 28 
April 2005, available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/ japan/tokai.htm; Internet; accessed 6 
June 2009; “Weapons of Mass Destruction: Rokkasho,” 28 April 2005, available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/japan/rokkasho.htm; Internet; accessed 6 June 2009. 
35 As detailed in the World Nuclear Association’s country fact sheet, Japan is determined to persevere 
with the Monju FBRs restart in late 2009. 
36 Yukihide Mori, Hiroshi Sagawa, Kazuhiko Kuroda, Tatsuhiro Yoshizu, “Mitsubishi Activities for 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development,” Technical Review 45 no.1 (2008), 54. 
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steps would be required to use one of the fast breeder reactors for the production of 
weapons grade PU-239, but they do not seem to be insurmountable.37   
Of course, nuclear fuel alone is not enough for a stable nuclear weapons program. 
In order for Japan to produce nuclear weapon material, facilities would have to undergo 
changes, weapons-grade material would have to be stored and Japanese nuclear civilian 
engineers would have to participate.  The next sections will deal with the specific 
material Japan already has and what changes that would be required to develop an 
indigenous nuclear weapons program. 
2.  Fissile Material 
The main source of nuclear weapons is Pu239. MOX fuel and Japanese FBRs use 
Pu239 in substantial amounts to create nuclear energy. However, there is a very clear 
difference. Nuclear weapons require very specific fissile material and Plutonium 239 
(Pu239) is the preferred source material for nuclear weapons.  The difference between 
Pu239 weapons-grade and Pu239 energy-grade material is only a small difference in 
quality.38 Pu239 forms Pu240 through the absorption of one neutron, resulting in a less 
fissile material.  In general, the U.S. Department of Energy classifies plutonium into 
grades based on the percentage of Pu240 content in any sample. Weapons-grade material 
has content of less than 7% while reactor-grade material has a much greater content, 
19%. Recent revelations by the U.S. Department of Energy revealed that reactor-grade 
material could be weaponized.39 If Japan decided to use reactor grade material, then a 
more finely-tuned weapons design would be required; even so, this solution would only 
be useful in a short time frame situation.  Over the longer term, Japan does have the 
 
37 A discussion by Jeffrey Lewis can be found at Armscontrolwonk.com, “Safeguarding Breeder 
Reactors,” 24 January 2006, available at http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/955/safeguarding-breeder-
reactors; Internet; accessed on 6 June 2009. The following authors deal with guarding the Japanese FBRs 
specifically because of proliferation concerns: Hashimoto et al., “Development of Plutonium Fuel Monitors 
for the Experimental Fast Reactor JOYO,” Proceeding of a Symposium on International Safeguards, IAEA-
SM-333/51, 427–438, Vienna, 14–18 March 1994; Usami et al, “Safeguards in Prototype Fast Breeder 
Reactor Monju,” 5th International conference on Facility Operation-Safeguards Interface, Jackson Hole, 
24–29 September 1995. 
38 Self and Thompson, “Nuclear Energy,” 165. 
39 Stephen Schwartz, “Hazel O’Leary Does Us a Favor by Declassifying Data,” The Washington 
Times, September 24, 1996. 
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reprocessing ability to create weapons-grade Pu239 at its Tokai reprocessing facility, and, 
therefore, has the capability to produce material for higher quality nuclear weapons.40 
Japan has abundant and growing nuclear material reserves due to the problems 
encountered recently by the civilian power program. Self speculates that these reserves 
have the potential to produce between 162 and 421 nuclear weapons with reprocessing.41 
Thompson and Self also conclude that the number is realistically towards the low end due 
to the time and expertise required to create weapons from this material.42 However, 
Japan’s numbers are set to increase further now that MHI has restarted the FBRs; and 
these numbers show no sign of decreasing until a number of advanced reactors begin 
coming online in 2010.43  
The simple fact is that Japan possesses more than enough material to produce a 
sizable number of nuclear weapons. But due to Japan’s signatory status in the NPT, Japan 
has pledged not to weaponize any fissile material it creates and is under IAEA 
safeguards, complicating any covert program.   This means that Japan will most likely 
avoid any nuclear testing and will have to resort to the U.S. method of testing using 
computer programs. Self and Thompson also point out that current laws forbid Japan’s 
engineers from researching nuclear weapons.  Moreover, all of Japan’s facilities are 
subject to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency.44  These restrictions on 
weapons testing and arms control agreements are no small matter and remain obstacles to 
 
40 MHI restarted the plant in 2000 despite an incident at the Tokai reprocessing facility in 1992.  As a 
commercial reprocessing facility capable of producing weapons-grade material it is monitored closely by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
41 Self and Thompson, “Nuclear Energy,” 164. 
42 Self and Thompson, “Nuclear Energy,” 165. 
43 Japan Atomic Energy Agency. JAEA press release; available from http://www.jaea.go.jp/english 
/news/090514/index.shtml; Internet; accessed 20 June 2009. 
44 Self and Thompson, “Nuclear Energy,” 165. 
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policy makers. However, a threatening security climate could cause Japan to conduct 
computerized weapon’s testing and withdraw from the NPT.45 
3.  Delivery Systems 
The second most difficult requirement for nuclear weapons is the delivery system. 
Most advanced countries mitigate this cost by modifying conventional long-range strike 
weapons. But, Japan does not possess a notable strike capability and is prevented from 
possessing offensive weapons.  To be considered a virtual nuclear state, Japan has had to 
invest in civilian delivery technology.  Japan has not only been one of the few countries 
to independently maintain its own civilian space program but also ensures its space 
program matches many other countries including the United States. 
Most of the nuclear countries of the world depend on ballistic missiles as the main 
delivery system. The United States no longer maintains its bombers on any alert status, 
and both China and Russia have allowed their bomber fleets to fall into disrepair. Japan, 
too, does not have viable aircraft for the delivery of strategic nuclear weapons.  JASDF’s 
F-4’s and the JSF are dual-capable aircraft, but they should not be considered a viable 
delivery vehicle due to China’s extensive anti-air warfare capabilities. Japan, however, is 
extremely familiar with building rockets and should have no trouble transitioning their 
missile technology from peaceful use to wartime use. 
Japan relies on a two-stage liquid-fueled rocket (H-2A) to launch most of its 
satellite payloads. The H-2A relies on solid booster rockets to amplify the range and 
weight capacity of the launch system. Although not entirely suitable for a viable nuclear 
deterrent due to its ??, the H-2A does have the range for a nuclear mission and a very 
accurate inertial guidance system that can be applied to a nuclear mission if no other 
 
45 Although there is no question that Japan has the technological understanding to produce a gun-type 
HEU atomic bomb, there would be limited military uses for such a weapon.  Any thermonuclear weapons 
Japan produces would require some testing since no country (including Israel) has fielded nuclear weapons 
without testing.  The Los Alamos National Laboratory details the hurdles required for the U.S. to field new 
nuclear weapons without testing in 1666, “W88 Pit Certification without Testing,” (Los Alamos: August 
2007) available at http://www.lanl.gov/news/index.php/fuseaction/1663.article/d/20078/id/11870; Internet; 
accessed on 6 June 2009. 
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options are present.46   The PRC used liquid fueled missiles as a minimum deterrent for 
decades, so for Japan to field a small number of liquid-fueled missiles while developing a 
more developed solid-state missile is conceivable.  Liquid-fueled missiles are 
inexpensive and quick to manufacture, which makes them easy to modify for a range of 
targets.  For instance, the H-2A is capable of an extremely large throw weight (up to 10 
tons for low earth orbit) and has numerous fairing models to allow for payload? size 
adaptability.  Given its lift capabilities, the H-2A would be placed in a category with 
most MRBMs and although the most probable targets are close, the shortened range 
would allow for a steeper and a harder to defend trajectory. 
The most technologically advanced ballistic missile Japan possesses is a solid-fuel 
three-stage rocket, the M-V.  Solid-fueled rockets are incredibly rare in the civilian space 
industry.  Japan’s M-V is best compared to the most advanced U.S. intercontinental 
ballistic missile (ICBM), the M-X Peacekeeper.  The M-V is capable of launching a 1.8-
ton satellite; and, if put on an ICBM trajectory, it is capable of launching a 2.2-ton 
warhead. Furthermore, reducing targets to a reasonable distance of 7,000 km for 
Moscow, the M-V can launch a 4-ton payload.47  It should be noted that Japan strongly 
denies the M-V is intended for any military application.  But this also seemingly conflicts 
with Japan’s Aerospace and Exploration Agency (JAXA) stated intent to maintain an 
edge in solid-fuel missile technology despite the cancellation of the M-V program.48 
Clearly, although not specifically designed for military purposes, the M-V maintains 
Japanese proficiency in a solid-state missile capability.  If Japan were to develop a 
military ballistic missile program, it will not have to start from scratch.  Future policy 
decisions concerning Japan’s solid-state missile programs will continue to have strong 
security implications. 
 
46 Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, “Leading Edge, Efficient and Economical Technology: 
Japanese Main Large-Scale Launch Vehicle, H-IIA,” available from http://www.jaxa.jp/projects 
/rockets/h2a/index_e.html; Internet; accessed 30 October 2008. 
47 Global Security, “Missile Program – Japan” available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/ 
world/japan/missile.htm; Internet; accessed on 30 October 08. 
48 Daily Yomiuri Online, “JAXA ends M-V Program,” Daily Yomiuri available from 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/features/science/20060805TDY04004.htm; Internet; accessed on 8 January 
2007.  
 19
                                                
Officials of the Japanese space agency hope that the new “Advanced Solid 
Rocket” in development to replace the M-V will fulfill this requirement. Scientists will 
use the solid-fueled M-V engine and boosters from the H-2A to create a new, cheaper 
alternative to the M-V while maintaining the technology for future possible security uses. 
Self argues that the space launch program as “a disguise for pursuit of a ballistic missile 
capability is strictly absurd.”49 However, Japan’s heavy investment in solid-fuel rocket 
technology is unique in that Japan is the only country to use solid-fuel technology for 
civilian purposes.50  Of the nuclear weapons states, Japan is the only country outside that 
number to have experience in solid-fuel rocket technology.  Japan keeps the option of 
developing a solid-fueled delivery system in the future. Japan can modify any rocket 
currently in production for a nuclear mission by adding a nuclear payload instead of a 
civilian one.  All the previous peacekeeper missiles are being used for civilian payload 
missions and numerous countries have interchanged their launch vehicles for nuclear or 
civilian missions. If consideration is given to the type of launch system required for 
Japan’s probability of nuclear threats, then it already has the capability. Japan is most 
likely to field Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) capable of a maximum range 
of 8,000 km, because Moscow is only 7,000 km away and Beijing is a mere 4,000 km.  
The H-2A and M-V rockets are capable of meeting these range requirements.  Japan has 
all the technology required to build the delivery system for a viable nuclear weapon. 
4.  Command, Control, and Strategic Warning 
Until recently, Japan lacked a strategic command, control, communication, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) structure. However, this changed 
rapidly after the Taepodong scare in the late 1990s. Japan developed and deployed the 
systems necessary to support a capable missile defense such as satellite monitoring, over-
the-horizon (OTH) radar, and the communications infrastructure. Very few authors have 
 
49 Self and Thompson, “Nuclear Energy,” 173. 
50 Only Israel (SHAVIT), the United States (TAURUS), and India (PSLV) use an all solid-fuel rocket 
for satellite launches. Israel’s SHAVIT is based on the JERICHO family of MRBM and is suspected of 
being a weapons test platform.  The U.S. TAURUS rocket is used for satellite launches and the research 
platform for the U.S. missile defense Ground Based Interceptors. India uses the PSLV for polar orbit 
satellites and sun-synchronous orbits due to the large throw weight required.  
 20
                                                
mentioned that these same systems and institutions are extremely similar to a nuclear 
C4ISR system.  The recent addition of this capability ensures Japan’s adversaries 
perceive Japan as a virtual nuclear state and this threat is reinforced by a command and 
control (C2) system with an improved strategic warning system and a C2 structure on par 
with the United States. 
The first thing essential to any command structure is the delineation and 
designation of the figure with release authority. This release authority is very dependent 
on notification intelligence systems, and Japanese systems are now if not soon will be 
capable of adequately responding to a strategic crisis in real time.  Nevertheless, the 
technical and hardware building blocks are moderately advanced… 
The Japanese parliament delineated the release authority for the Japanese missile 
defense system with a provision to the Self Defense Forces Law in 2002. In any slowly 
escalating crisis, the defense minister will request the deployment of the missile shield.  
However, in an emergency situation, the Defense Minister can deploy the system and 
instruct Japanese ships and batteries to use standing rules of engagement that allow for 
firing on an incoming missile.  Japan’s command and control system has undergone 
changes with the introduction of BMD.51  It now closely resembles similar command and 
control systems for U.S. BMD.  Both these systems originated and mimic nuclear 
command and control communication systems and hierarchy.  Japan’s new experience in 
BMD command and control will benefit any future nuclear command and control system 
it implements. 
Japan also has spy satellites devoted to national defense. Two of the four satellites 
currently observe North Korea for only part of the day. The constellation was completed 
in early 2007. Although, these satellites do not provide continuous coverage, they can 
feasibly monitor nuclear and missile staging in northeast Asia.52 Japan has initiated plans 
to implement a satellite based missile detection system, which the Japanese Diet 
 
51 Masahiro Matsumura, “Redesigning Japan’s Command and Control System for Theater Missile 
Defense,” Defense and Security Analysis 16, no. 2 (2000), 151–164. 
52 Eric Talmadge, “Japan Plans September Launch for New Spy Satellite,” Associated Press, 15 July 
2006. 
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approved in June 2009.53  They are capable of providing queuing for the other missile 
defense systems and could offer targets, if Japan decided to use a counter-force strategy.  
But, counter-force or not, it is essential in nuclear escalation crises to identify enemy 
force buildup to craft the proper response. Moreover, launch site identification for 
intelligence purposes is essential in any capable command and control system. Satellites 
can only provide rough tracking estimates due to their high aperture. The detection 
system serves to initiate decision-making processes and key earth-based radar systems for 
follow-up tracking. 
An accurate radar system is essential for missile telemetry information. Land-
based over-the-horizon radar is undergoing testing in Japan. This radar will be the 
forefront of the Japanese mainland ballistic warning system. Sufficiently modern radar 
performing this function can have a detection range of about 1000 km. The future 
warning and control radar (FPS) in Asahi Chiba Prefecture will imitate the current U.S. 
radar defense system.54 Five FPS radar systems will blanket the western air space 
approaching Japan. The United States currently deploys its new forward deployable X-
band radar system to Japan.55  The X-band radar is based on a modified oil rig and 
provides a high resolution missile tracking system. Because the X-band radar is mobile, it 
can be adjusted for changes in perceived threat and avoid counter targeting on the rare 
days it is deemed seaworthy.  
The radar and satellite systems are essential for detecting and tracking missile 
threats. When the satellite system detects a missile launch, it notifies personnel of a 
possible missile threat. This threat initiates command notification within a few minutes 
while the radar sites are notified of the threat. During command notification, the radar 
sites offer another phenomenology of the possible threat and also offer detailed telemetry 
of the estimated path of the missile. A decision-making conference using the intelligence 
 
53 Isabel Reynolds, “Japan Plans Missile Warning System,” Reuters, 2 June 2009, Internet; available 
online at http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE5511T220090602; accessed on 6 June 2009. 
54 Tokyo Kyodo World Service, “Kyodo: Japan To Deploy 11 New Radar Systems To Detect Ballistic 
Missiles,” Kyodo World Service, September 2005; available from FBIS JPP20050910000008; “Progress in 
Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System Reviewed,” Tokyo Sekai Shuho, August 2005, 60–61; 
available from FBIS JPP20050815000050. 
55 Jim Mannion, “US To Deploy Anti-Missile Radar In Japan Missile Threat,” Agence-France Presse, 
July 26, 2006. 
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provided by both radar and satellite is conducted to determine the veracity of the threat 
and the appropriate action warranted. In the United States, the decision to launch a 
retaliatory strike or activate missile defenses occurs almost immediately and likewise in 
Japan.56  The most recent 2+2 talks57 concluded with a “Joint Statement of the Security 
Consultative Committee Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan 
Security and Defense Cooperation” that laid out a roadmap for the joint development of 
the command and control structure for missile defense. This is an effort by both parties 
for Japan to emulate the U.S.’s C2 system. In Japan, an almost identical process is being 
formed. JASDF’s Air Defense Command, which is similar in nature to the USAF’s Air 
Combat Command relocated to Yokota AB from Fuchu AB.  This move was in part to 
integrate Japan’s air defense structure but also to emulate the 13th Air Force’s current 
missile defense C2 system in Hickam AFB.  The USAF and JASDF are also manning a 
new Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC), which has a major missile 
defense component. These command and control institutions and processes are new to the 
JSDF.  They are not only essential to missile defense success but also to any nuclear 
strategy. Japan is building all the pieces and learning all the lessons for a credible nuclear 
deterrent without the nuclear component.   
D.  MISSILE DEFENSE 
The centerpiece of Japanese strategic capability is their new BMD system. Japan 
employs a tiered defense system. For the threat of ballistic missiles, for instance, land-
based, long-range radar and satellites identify missile threats and cue other assets. Aegis 
destroyers can track and destroy missiles in their midcourse flight; Patriot-3 (PAC-3) 
missile batteries can engage any missiles that slip past during their terminal phase of 
flight.  
The first of these technologies is a BMD-point defense system. Japan is importing 
from the United States the PAC-3 upgrade to its existing PAC-2 infrastructure. The 
 
56 Ministry of Defense, “BMD 2009” available from http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/bmd/; Internet; 
accessed 5 March 2009. 
57 The “2+2 Talks” are the informal name for the Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee that 
consists of the U.S. Secretaries of Defense and State and Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense. 
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missiles have been given new hit-to-kill capability, drastically increasing their 
effectiveness. More to the point, the upgrade has drastically broadened the type of 
ballistic missiles the system can engage from second-generation surface-to-surface 
missiles to several third generation58 intermediate-range missiles. In order to greater 
ensure Japan’s defensive posture it has gained the right to upgrade and manufacture the 
missiles domestically. Japan will be the only country besides the United States, India and 
Israel to develop, manufacture, and repair its missile defense system independently. 
To become self-sufficient in its defense, Japan is deploying its own batteries and 
building its own missiles. With U.S. assistance, Japan has completed the upgrade for their 
four PAC-2 systems and deployed them around the Kanto plain to protect the Tokyo 
metropolitan area.59  New batteries are planned, one of the few increases noted in the 
Japanese defense budget.60  Domestic production began in 2008 because the U.S. 
government licensed MHI to build PAC-3s with delivery beginning in 2009. Future 
deployments could focus on the Nagoya-Osaka region, as well as sensitive defensive 
areas such as military bases. The eventual deployment of this point defense system as a 
terminal-phase defense is the defense of last resort. Although it can protect about 90% of 
the Japanese population, it is only one part of an effective BMD system. 
The second part of the defense system is improvement of the midcourse (or 
midflight) BMD system. Japanese navy ships are equipped with SM-361 missiles capable 
of destroying ballistic missiles on the edge of space as they re-enter the atmosphere. 
These ships are capable of independently tracking exo-atmospheric objects and rapidly 
firing on one or numerous targets. The missiles are built to communicate directly with the 
ship during the initial phase of flight. The SM-3 round then independently identifies the 
 
58 Third Generation Intermediate-range missiles refer to the increase of speed of the missile and the 
ability for defensive systems to intercept them.  Second generation surface-to-surface missiles generally 
refer to increases in accuracy and control. 
59 Associated Press, “Japan to test Missile Interceptor in US,” The Washington Post, 12 July 2008. 
60 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, “Midterm Defense Buildup Program Reflecting Current Need for Security – 
FY2010–2014 Program Now being Examined,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 14 August 08; available from FBIS 
JPP20080814034001. 
61 The SM-3 stands for Standard Missile 3.  The missile has the stated capability to destroy space 
borne warheads kinetically.  It has also recently displayed the capability to destroy satellites but according 
to the Department of Defense this was after heavy modifications. 
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target warhead, engages it, and directly impacts the target. In December 2007, the JS 
Kongo successfully tested its missile defense. Although the Kongo class can carry a 
maximum of 80 missiles, it will be years before Japan has the necessary missile inventory 
to fill the four ships. Once the upgrades to all four ships are complete, Japan will be able 
to defend hundreds of miles of territory. This midcourse defense will complement the 
PAC-3 improvements and provide Japan with a layered and more effective BMD system. 
Japan has the capability to defend itself against increasing types and numbers of 
ballistic missiles. Although it does not seem currently to provide an impenetrable 
umbrella, Japan has significantly decreased the threat and deterrence value of any 
opponent’s nuclear force. Moreover, Japan’s current defense plans will only result in 
increased capability, thereby causing further decline in any opponent’s deterrence value. 
The combination of these legs illustrates the tactical implementation of the Japan 
Self Defense Force’s BMD forces. The early warning radar will identify missile threats in 
the boost phase or early midcourse phase with a decision required extremely early to 
utilize the midcourse defense and, in extreme circumstances, rely upon the PAC-3 
structure to provide the necessary backup. This quick reaction is necessary due to the 
extremely fast missile threat times for the area.62 With the dual coverage of the 
midcourse defense, one Aegis BMD cruiser can defend against an estimated sixteen 
missiles supplemented by each PAC-3 battery providing an estimated defense against 
eight terminal-phase missiles. With this projected BMD force structure, Japan can 
currently defend against a couple of missiles and is expected to defend against a dozen 
missiles by the end of JFY 2009, and dozens more by the end of 2010.63 According to 
current Japanese plans, defense capability can be expected to continue growing until 
2011 when the MOD completes the system.  
 
62 Minimum missile flight times from North Korea are 10 minutes and 13 minutes from China. 
63 The two-on-one principle results from the estimated 90% success rate for an individual missile. By 
adding a second missile, the success rate is increased by 9% to reach a ~99% success rate.  Operationally, 
JMSDF and USN missile destroyers are trained to shoot, look to see if the target has been killed and then 
shoot again if it has not.  Also, if the intercept window is too short, then shooting twice independently will 
be necessary. 
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E.  JAPAN’S NUCLEAR STRATEGY 
Japan’s current strategy, with respect to a possible nuclear confrontation with 
China, seems to be straightforward: Combine a two-layer active missile defense against 
China’s main nuclear force with U.S. extended deterrence as a third layer of assured 
destruction.64 However, there seems to be a fourth layer to Japanese strategy not included 
in most scholarly analysis.  Japan’s status as a “virtual nuclear state” assures that Japan 
will have an open ended option in future relations with China.  For Japan’s “virtual 
nuclear state” status to have any deterrent value it must not only be a reliable possibility, 
but one where a strategy could conceivably be created and implemented.  The most 
beneficial nuclear strategy for Japan can be theorized by analyzing its adversary, 
considering possible weapons, its geographical position, and giving consideration to 
grand strategy theory. 
Japan’s future nuclear strategy, if it develops nuclear weapons, is an interesting 
case to hypothesize. A country’s grand strategy usually arises from a number of factors. 
The first and simplest of these factors is the adversary. China has been Japan’s main 
adversary for more than a century. Although a similar case can be made for Russia and 
the Soviet Union, there is very little chance of a sudden renewal of Russian interest in the 
Far East that can conceivably vie for China’s preeminence. China’s nuclear forces are 
being modernized and consist of a few ICBMs supported by a few hundred regional-
range missiles. Its force structure is not very survivable at present against someone like 
the U.S., but there is a strong effort to do just that with China’s development of nuclear 
missile submarines and other improvements. It appears that these submarines will be 
deployed to the South Sea Fleet and will take advantage of the large amount of water 
space in the South China Sea and avoid the United States and Japan’s robust anti-
submarine capability along the Ryuku Island Chain and the East China Sea. In sum, this 
 
64 General consensus among scholars seems to be that Japan will continue to forgo nuclear weapons as 
long as it continues to succeed in strengthening the U.S.–Japanese alliance.  More detailed analysis of these 
opinions can be found in: Mike M. Mochizuki, “Japan Tests the Nuclear Taboo,” Nonproliferation Review 
14 (July 2007); available online at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol14/142/142mochizuki.pdf; Internet; 
accessed on 6 June 2009; Llewelyn Hughes, “Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet): International and 
Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan” International Security: 31 (Spring 2007), 67; James 
Schoff, “The U.S.–Japan Alliance and the Future of Extended Deterrence,” Institute for Foreign Policy 
Analysis (2009). 
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offers a very general picture of China’s future nuclear forces. With roughly the same 
number of missiles, but upgraded and enhanced with multiple re-entry vehicles, 
supported by a greater communications infrastructure and backed with an actual 
survivable second strike capability, these forces offer a greater chance that at least one or 
two weapons will be assuredly strike Japan and the United States. 
The second and slightly harder factor is the type of nuclear forces Japan can field. 
The easiest weapon system to disregard is long-range bombers. Japan does not have the 
aircraft or the superiority to ensure Japanese nuclear bombers will reach their targets. The 
idea of a Japanese B-2 bomber is a little far-fetched compared to other options.  
Another possibility is the development of nuclear submarines. Japan has 
maintained a very regular and small attack submarine force. The new class of submarine 
could be fitted with TLAMs tipped with nuclear warheads to give Japan a more 
survivable deterrent. A nominal range of 2,000 km would put 90% of the Chinese 
population at threat. A stumbling block could be Japan’s lack of experience and 
capability with cruise missiles and the challenges with designing miniature warheads. 
This can be overcome but the alternative would also have to be considered by developing 
submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).  Developing a dedicated strategic ballistic 
missile submarine force, however, will require tremendous help from the United States. 
Japan lacks the expertise in underwater vertical launch technology to make the platform 
effective. SLBMs and Cruise Missiles technologies are both areas that will require 
substantial research and development or assistance from the United States.  Cruise 
missiles seem to be the lesser of the two, since it is similar to jet aircraft production.    
Finally, Japan possesses a well-established ICBM capability. Ballistic missiles are 
cheap compared to the alternatives. Furthermore, Japan can use the missile defense 
system to defend against these nuclear weapons as well, which reduces the need for 
hardened silos. This is fortuitous because Japan will have trouble installing silos in an 
area so earthquake prone. Furthermore, the best deployment sites for these missiles will 




                                                
placed in harm’s way. Japan already uses islands such as Iwo Jima and Okinawa to 
distance military operations from the public and will very likely continue this trend in the 
deployment of nuclear weapons.   
Japan’s geographical position also induces a territorial imperative. The addition of 
a capable missile defense gives Japan greater strategic depth.  Historically though, 
Japan’s strategic doctrine was heavily influenced by the idea that Japan’s islands and 
concentrated population centers make it more vulnerable to just a few nuclear weapons. 
Previous Japanese doctrines have relied upon pre-emptive strategies to stop attacks from 
reaching its homeland.  Just as Israel has relied upon a preemptive strategy, due to its lack 
of territorial space, Japan has also previously resorted to preemptive strategies to stop 
enemies far from the water’s edge.65 And most recently, Japanese defense ministers 
proposed a pre-emptive strategy against the possible nuclear North Korean threat.66 An 
offensive strategy like this is what worries Beijing the most about missile defense.  Brad 
Roberts quotes Zhuang Qubing’s early Chinese perspective concerning SDI (Qubing 
1984, 10): 
The primary military significance of this [missile defense] is the 
possibility of possessing the ability to launch a first strike… This is quite 
different from the mutually assured destruction strategy, which aims 
primarily at launching the second strike… Therefore, the new strategy is 
not a strategy of defense as publicized by the U.S. administration, but is a 
strategy which integrates attacks with defense, capable of dealing deadly 
blows to the enemy.67 
These concerns made sense given the time required for China to mate its 
warheads and fuel its missiles. This situation has become more volatile, however, since 
China has turned to solid state-fueled missiles that eliminate preparation time. This 
makes a preemptive strategy more tempting if China’s adversary can discover it is DF-
 
65 Michael Handel, “The Evolution of Israeli Strategy: The Psychology of Insecurity and the Quest for 
Absolute Security,” in The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War, ed. Williamson Murray, 
MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 534–578. 
66 Anthony Faiola, “In Japan, Tough Talk About Preemptive Capability: China, Russia ‘Deplore’ N. 
Korean Missile Tests,” The Washington Post, 11 July 2006, A14. 
67 Zhang Qubing, “Meiguo ‘Xingqiu Dazhan Jihua’ Poxi,” in Guoji Wenti Yanjiu, no. 4.  available in 
translation in Selected Articles of International Studies (Beijing, China Translation and Publishing 
Corporation, 1987). 
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21/25 deployment sites.   The resulting combination of Japan’s territorial attributes, the 
predilection for preemption, the offensive aspect of Japan’s missile defense, and China’s 
mobile MRBMs, offer a dangerously quick escalation ladder.  
Japan also has a tendency to rely heavily on technology. Derived originally from 
Japan’s population disadvantage against other states, the trend of Japan’s declining 
worker population has reinforced this notion. Japan’s leading development in robots and 
manufacturing efficiency is evidence of its dependence on technology. Militarily, Japan 
relies on advanced fighter aircraft, cutting-edge destroyers, and now a ballistic missile 
shield. Of course, the Japanese should eventually embrace what Handel calls the 
“ultimate technological panacea” in referring to Israel, Handel remarks, “Nuclear 
weapons must be seen in a psychological context as the ‘ultimate guarantee’ that their 
nation can, if necessary, prevent a major conventional defeat and protect itself from 
annihilation.”68  Japan will not likely face the possibility of low-intensity conflict or 
small border wars with its neighbors; the most probably war Japan faces is that of major 
regional conflict. In waging a war in a major regional conflict, Japan must use technology 
to balance the scales against bigger adversaries.  
In order to implement a grand strategy dependent upon missile defense and a 
virtual nuclear capability, there must be a singular strategy to ensure consistency. But, 
this singular strategy is missing from all of Japan’s strategic documents including its 
yearly defense White Paper. Japan forms a grand strategy through an informal consensus 
building process that usually results in a forward thinking and comprehensive strategy.  
Moreover, Japan does not normally publish its grand strategies formally. Japanese 
political ideology makes the informal process possible by blurring the distinction 
between society and state and allows for decision making to travel up, down, and across 
without formal decisions. Knox addresses this unique process by stating that Japan 
resembles Germany after 1918 with a similar quasi-racial superiority and its ability to 
create a national strategy without formal doctrine.69 As a result, Japan informally focuses 
 
68 Handel, “Evolution of Israeli Strategy,” 535. 
69 MacGregor Knox, “Continuity and Revolution in Strategy,” in The Making of Strategy: Rulers, 
States and War, ed. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press): 644; Karel Van Wolferen, “No Brakes, No Compass,” The National Interest, no.25 (Fall, 
1991). 
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on the best way to deter China by providing for a strong defense and a sufficient virtual 
nuclear capability. China is effectively deterred because they already believe in the 
psychological effects of a limited arsenal (as will be discussed in the next chapter) and 
does not need to be convinced of the Japanese propensity to use such weapons. By 
continuing to publicly embrace a non-nuclear position but maintaining the capabilities to 
develop nuclear weapons, Japan has cemented its status as a “virtual” nuclear state.  
Japan combined this informal and ambiguous nuclear position with a capable 
independent missile defense making a unique and effective deterrence strategy designed 













































                                                
III. STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES, POLICIES AND 
PERCEPTIONS FOR CHINA 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few decades, international security analysts have seen a dramatic 
shift in China’s military. Experts have written countless papers on changes in China’s 
military spending, military capabilities, and even its military strategy. However, unlike 
China’s conventional war strategy, there is little evidence that China’s nuclear strategy 
will shift any time soon. China’s strategic capabilities still point to a strategy of minimum 
deterrence.  Any minor improvements in China’s capabilities can be directly attributed to 
increases in defense missile technology on the part of the United States and Japan. This 
thesis will begin by examining recent changes in China’s nuclear triad, evaluating those 
changes and their impact on the regional security environment.  Next, we will take a look 
at the evolution of Chinese nuclear strategy and the Chinese effort to maintain 
“minimum” deterrence.  Finally, how the Japanese missile defense system may have 
caused these changes in Chinese nuclear capability.  The Chinese strive to maintain 
minimum deterrence despite the changing security environment and the changes required 
in Chinese nuclear capabilities as a result of BMD. 
B.  DESCRIPTION OF CHINESE NUCLEAR FORCES 
1.  Ballistic Missile Submarines 
Submarine launched ballistic missile test launches are few and far between, and 
China is still experiencing failure in some of the launches.70   Regardless, the Chinese 
are determined to turn this trend around. In 2004, China deployed its new ballistic 
submarine. The Type-094 (or Jin) submarine, launched two years early, is generally 
 
70 Test problems were originally noted in “China Tests Ballistic Missile Submarine,” The Washington 
Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/dec/02/20041202-115302-2338r/; Internet; accessed 
24 October 2008; the most recent OSD report still lists the JL-2 as developmental with an initial operational 
capability in 2009–2010, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of 
the People’s Republic of China 2009 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2009), 60. 
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regarded not to be operational because the SLBM associated with it, the JL-2, is still in 
development. The JL-2 is based on the DF-31 and has a range of 8,000 km. The Jin 
would have to patrol north of the Kuriles to put any substantial portion of the continental 
United States within range.  However, Chinese patrols this far north play too heavily to 
the American Navy’s strong suit for open water Anti-submarine warfare. This makes it 
more likely that the Chinese will use a strategy similar to the Soviet Union, using the 
South China Sea or Yellow Sea as a strategic bastion, in which case the new PLA(N) 
SSBNs will hold the region at risk and not pose a direct threat to the continental United 
States.  Interestingly, Japan would fall under this umbrella, and these new submarines go 
a long way towards giving China a secure second-strike capability albeit against 
secondary targets, from the perspective of the United States.  The serious investment in 
such a capability hints at China’s determination to establish a thoroughly modern 
strategic for
2.  Strategic Bombers  
The PLAAF strategic bomber force consists of vintage aircraft incapable of 
defeating modern air defenses. The H-6 (Badger) aircraft is quickly approaching status as 
a collector’s item and is entirely incapable of defeating Japan’s air defenses in any 
number. However, recent improvements in the H-6 are modifications vaguely similar to 
those implemented by the United States to make the B-52 aircraft conventionally 
applicable. With the newly developed land attack cruise missile, the bomber is capable of 
launching missiles from outside air defenses and hitting targets up to 200 km away.71  It 
is also worth noting that China is interested in developing stealth technology for strike 
fighters but not long-range bombers.72 These modifications signify China’s abandonment 
of nuclear bombers.  
 
71 “China Tests YJ-63: Land Attack Cruise Missile,” Sinodefense.com; available from 
http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/weapon/kd63.asp; Internet; accessed 24 October 2008. 
72 Yihong Chang, “China Launches New Stealth Fighter Project,” Zhuhai. 10 December 2002. 
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3.  Land-based Ballistic Missiles  
China’s land-based ballistic missiles are the predominant leg of the triad. China 
roughly deploys 110 nuclear-capable ballistic missiles of three different ranges: 18-20 
ICBMs, 12-22 IRBMs, and 35-80 MRBMs.73  The ICBM is the liquid-fueled Dong Feng 
(DF)-5, thought to be dedicated to the United States with a range of 13,000 km. Although 
the 12–22 IRBMs are often referred to as capable of striking U.S. soil, the liquid-fueled 
DF-4 (with its 5,500 km range) is thought to serve as a “retaliatory deterrent against 
targets in Russia and Asia.”74 Therefore, with only 18–20 missiles dedicated to striking 
the continental United States, the medium-range missiles are targeted regionally. Of an 
estimated 108 regional ballistic missiles, 82 are within range of Japan, compared to the 
66 missiles within range of India.75 Although some of these missiles are mobile and 
thereby slightly distorts the numbers, it seems that China targets Japan with nuclear 
missiles and is willing to threaten Japan with a greater number of missiles than most 
other countries in the region. 
China’s SRBMs are not yet publicly confirmed as being nuclear capable. The 
U.S. Defense Department 2005 report on China’s military power identifies the missiles as 
conventionally armed.76 If there is any mention of their nuclear capability, it remains 
classified. These missiles can largely be ignored for the Sino-Japan strategic balance 
because they are incapable of reaching Japan regardless of their forward deployment 
sites. 
 
73 Jeffrey Lewis, “The Ambiguous Arsenal,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May/June 2003); 
Jeffrey Lewis, “Letters to the Editor: Nuclear Numerology Chinese Style,” Arms Control Today (March, 
2005); Robert S. Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces 2008,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 64. no. 3 
available from http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/25094v7235832574/fulltext.pdf; Internet; accessed 
24 October 2008. 
74 George Perkovich, “The Nuclear and Security Balance,” in The India–China Relationship, ed. 
Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding (New York, Columbia University Press: 2004), 189. 
75 Phillip Saunders and Jing Dong Yuan, “Strategic Force Modernization,” in China’s Nuclear Future, 
ed Paul J. Bolt and Albert S. Willner (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers), 106–109. 
76 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the 
People’s Republic of China 2005 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2005); Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. 
Norris, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2003,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November/December), 77–80; 
Lewis, “Letter to the Editor.” 
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Two of the missile types are undergoing upgrading. The liquid-fueled DF-3 is 
gradually being replaced by the solid-fueled DF-21. The upgrade has lasted a number of 
years with an estimated 16 DF-3s still in operation. The upgrade of the medium-range 
missiles before the ICBMs may be a hint at the greater perceived threat from regional 
powers or reflect the lesser difficulty in researching smaller solid-fuel rockets. The 
Chinese have begun fielding new solid-fueled long-range missiles. The DF-31 has a 
range of 8,000 km, a hint that it will replace the DF-4 to improve regional striking 
capability.77  The DF-31A is a slightly modified DF-31 with a 12,000 km range, easily 
placing the U.S. Midwest with its ICBM silos at threat.  Jane’s Information Group 
believes the Chinese already have the capability to multiple independent reentry vehicle 
(MIRV) or multiple re-entry vehicle (MRV) their warheads, thereby challenging any U.S. 
missile defense system.78  In 2001, both the CIA and National Intelligence Council 
agreed that it was possible to place a few of the much smaller DF-31 reentry vehicles into 
the larger, older DF-5s.79 Norris remains unsure whether the Chinese have multiple 
warheads on the new missiles, but the latest DoD analysis still counts the DF-31s with 
one warhead a piece.80 It is doubtful the Chinese will build any more of the aging DF-5s, 
so the upper estimate of reentry vehicles any missile defense will likely face is 150. This 
fits neatly with the 155-warhead future predictions provided the Defense Intelligence 
Agency.81 
The DF-31 is undergoing improvements intended to add a larger range and a 
MIRV capability. Another modification of the DF-31 will make it suitable for submarine 
launches as the JL-2.82 There has also been a recent public revelation of China’s 
 
77 Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces.” 
78 Jane’s Information Group, Strategic Weapon Systems 47 (2007), 12. 
79 Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Estimate: Foreign Missile Developments and the 
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15 July 2008; The National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile 
Threat Through 2015 (December 2001), 8. 
80 Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces”; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress 
2009. 
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(July 1999), 38. 
82 Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces.” 
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underground submarine tunnel.83 Improvements in China’s command and control system 
leave much to be desired as Lewis states the Chinese have never placed their nuclear 
forces under alert and are unsure of the outcome.84  Recently the Chinese have made 
strides in upgrading communication systems but these systems have not yet proven 
operationally capable in a crisis, much less a post-attack situation.85 Furthermore, with 
China’s transition from liquid-fueled, unmated-warhead posture to the emerging solid-
fueled, ready-to-launch posture, there must be radical changes in how China controls its 
nuclear forces. 
C.  CHINA’S NUCLEAR STRATEGY  
Currently, China follows a retaliation strategy that can be likened to a delayed 
second strike. From an operational standpoint, China will retaliate after absorbing a 
nuclear strike rather than attempting either a launch-under-attack (LUA) or a launch-on-
warning (LOW) strategy in which missiles are launched after detection of an attack but 
before impact. China arguably does not possess nor is developing the requisite early 
warning capabilities to move toward a LUA/LOW policy.  A delayed second strike 
implemented with an increasing number of accurate and survivable nuclear forces 
translates to a Chinese nuclear strategy of “minimum deterrence.” It is the minimum 
required to deter adversaries from launching a first strike.  Unfortunately, the “minimum” 
has been changing due to changes in China’s security environment and its nuclear 
capability.  The first section will deal with the changes in China’s security environment 
that has necessitated changes in minimum deterrence.  The second section will deal those 
nuclear force changes China has implemented and how they support China’s nuclear 
strategy. 
China’s nuclear strategy has evolved as a result of changes in the international 
security environment. The Cold War ended, and the United States and the rest of the 
 
83 Bill Gertz, “Commercial photos show Chinese nuke buildup,” The Washington Times, 16 February 
2006. 
84 Lewis, Minimum Means of Reprisal, 166. 
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world reacted negatively to the incident in Tiananmen Square. China’s domestic political 
leadership evolved a response, and as a result, nuclear strategy also had to evolve to the 
new structure of international relations.86  For decades, the Chinese depended on minimal 
deterrence by holding at risk only a few of an adversary’s major cities. As a result of this 
defensive orientation, China’s doctrine has been characterized as “anti-nuclear 
blackmail.”87 China believes in targeting concentrated population centers (counter-value) 
second-strike deterrence strategy, and reflecting Chinese nuclear capabilities. It also 
reflects the strong fear of nuclear holocaust in both the Soviet Union and the United 
States. Luckily, the changes to the international structure in the early 1990s also occurred 
during Chinese nuclear technological gains. As a result, China was able to expand its 
nuclear repertoire and adjusting to the changing environment. It broadened its nuclear 
strategy to what Johnston refers to as “limited deterrence.” This requires striking military 
facilities, infrastructure, and command and control nodes to limit an adversary’s ability to 
control the escalation process better.88 In developing its military strategy, China, unlike 
Japan, did not find itself with any specific adversary. Due to all of its possible 
adversaries, China broadened its nuclear strategy from minimum deterrence to limited 
deterrence. 
Starting with its first nuclear weapon, China has slowly but consciously increased 
it nuclear force capability. As Chinese strategy has changed so has it changed how it 
employs nuclear weapons. Research on the interaction between China’s strategy and the 
numbers of nuclear weapons it employed started shortly after China successfully tested 
its own nuclear weapon in 1964. China’s case was unique because it was the first nuclear 
country without especially strong ties to either the United States or to the Soviet Union. 
China positioned itself as the leader of the non-aligned movement of third world 
countries. In disrupting this balance, China heralded future proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. China attempted to dissuade the rest of the world by proclaiming a new nuclear 
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strategy of minimum deterrence based on a “political assessment—how likely the enemy 
was to use nuclear weapons, what the political preconditions were for such use, and what 
the political repercussions might be from such use.”89 Lewis elaborates on this statement 
by positing that the Chinese emphasize the nature of how just a few nuclear weapons and 
their tremendous psychological impact in deterring its enemies.90 Sha Zukang also argues 
that a small nuclear force can deter a larger one because of the nuclear weapon’s 
awesome destructive power.91 A key strategic level concept of houfa zhiren or “gaining 
mastery by striking after the enemy has struck,” supports this psychological attack. Sha 
Zukang habitually pointed out that the U.S. BMD system threatens the usefulness of 
keeping a small nuclear deterrent, and it forces China to expand its nuclear arsenal in 
response because a BMD system defeats the idea of houfa zhiren, if a second strike can 
be blunted or destroyed completely.92 Over the past five years, the number and 
technological capability of China’s nuclear weapons have expanded.   
This expansion in the numbers of Chinese nuclear weapons heralds a clear shift in 
Chinese nuclear strategy.  Although there is dispute as to whether the Chinese are using 
“minimum” or “limited” deterrence, from the Chinese perspective, “minimum” may be a 
constantly changing requirement.  This requires a shift in strategy, as a result of a 
changing security environment and the capability of China’s nuclear forces.  From the 
Chinese perspective, the most drastic changes in China’s security environment have 
occurred recently with a normalizing and “rearming” Japan. 
D.  RESPONSES TO THE JAPANESE BMD SYSTEM 
One of the key issues related to China’s nuclear deterrence concerns various 
Japanese proposals to deploy missile defenses. China believes that such developments 
will undermine the credibility of the Chinese nuclear deterrent and it strongly opposes 
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BMD. China has indicated that further development or deployment of such systems may 
compel China to expand its nuclear arsenal and intensify its nuclear weapons 
modernization efforts.93  
The fielding of the Japanese BMD system occurred at the same time as the U.S. 
BMD system. Therefore, it has not been easy to separate the two from the point of view 
of seeing the reaction of China strategy solely from one actor or another especially 
without obvious indicators like the deployment of penetration aids on the DF-21 vice DF-
31. As with the previous Japanese study, one must look at the change in Chinese PRC 
capability. To deter a nonnuclear power from becoming a nuclear power without 
provoking it to become a nuclear power, a country must publicly maintain a no first use 
policy to avoid any outright provocation while privately working on a strategy to 
convince its enemies that it possesses the resolve to use nuclear weapons in the face of 
attack. This is accomplished by voicing a clear political and diplomatic message 
combined with a “comprehensive and firm combat readiness” in order to retaliate 
immediately after a first strike.94 
China seeks to deter Japan from developing its own nuclear weapons by 
possessing an overwhelming quantity and diversity of nuclear weapons and delivery 
systems to ensure that China has a minimum capability to strike Japan with a nuclear 
weapon. This means China must maintain the ability to strike Japanese territory despite 
BMDs. China does not use assured destruction or complete destruction of the Japanese 
islands, as a strategy. From the Chinese psychological perspective, China only needs to 
use one or two nuclear weapons to deter Japan successfully. This is based on the belief 
that the Chinese are content with at least one major city destroyed to successfully deter 
the United States.95 In comparison, destroying one or two Japanese cities would inflict 
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comparatively more civilian casualties because 43% (60 million) of the Japanese 
population is located in Tokyo and Osaka.  These two cities make up the bulk of the 
urban population with the city of Nagoya as a very distant third with two million people. 
In response to the Japanese–U.S. development of BMDs, China has proposed various 
new technologies to defeat these defense systems. The most prominent of these 
technologies is a multiple re-entry vehicle to create “dummy” warheads for the kill 
vehicle to destroy.96 Therefore, by creating useless extra warheads, the PRC can maintain 
its nuclear deterrent without escalation by introducing more nuclear weapons.  Another 
type of missile defense countermeasure is penetration aids. According to a leaked PRC 
report, China has been testing these aids since 1999.97  All of these improvements are 
direct responses to the proliferation of BMD and reveals the new Chinese attitude 
concerning weapons development and procurement as well as changes in nuclear 
strategy. 
E. CHINA’S NUCLEAR FUTURE 
These recent changes to China’s nuclear forces have resulted in some internal 
Chinese discussion about the future of their nuclear strategy. Medieros offers a few 
possibilities for changes in future Chinese nuclear strategy from offering conditions to the 
“no first use” pledge to development of MIRV warheads or explicit adoption of launch 
doctrines such as “launch on warning” or “launch under attack.”98 However, these 
improvements seem to be in response to the development of BMD and not a response to 
the U.S. Strategic Command’s implementation of Global Strike or other U.S. nuclear 
improvements.  The Chinese are determined to maintain an underlying policy of 
minimum deterrence. Many Chinese analysts note that it is counterproductive to counter 
BMDs with a large force buildup and that believe China should focus on increasing the 
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survivability of the Chinese ICBM force and augmenting those ICBMs with penetration 
aids.99  The Chinese ultimately desire to maintain a doctrinal status quo by slowly 
increasing its nuclear capability and the survivability of its current nuclear forces. 
China should maintain its minimum deterrence policy in the near term. One can 
also expect the idea of minimum deterrence to continue to shape the ideas for Chinese 
nuclear strategy in the long term.    
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IV. THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AND GENERAL 
DETERRENCE THEORY 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Some inductive theorists have attempted longitudinal studies, which consider 
long-term deterrence relationships, but this requires understanding a range of independent 
factors working on both parties over time, as well as the interaction between the two 
parties.  The previous two sections attempted to establish the current capabilities and 
interaction of China and Japan. On the one hand, Japan carefully established a “virtual” 
nuclear deterrent and recently developed a missile defense system. On the other hand, 
China maintains a small or “minimum” force that is developing countermeasures to 
ballistic missile defense.   This third section seeks to describe their bilateral strategic 
relationship in terms of the recent reassessment of deterrence theory.   
It is necessary to first establish and clearly define the type of deterrence relevant 
to this situation, in order to set a boundary for when deterrence is used and when it is not.  
Second, this chapter will discuss what deterrence theory implies about the Sino-Japanese 
relationship and its established norms, taking a longitudinal view. Finally, it will evaluate 
the recent changes in both party’s force structures, as detailed in the first two chapters, 
with deterrence theory in mind.  
By looking at the relationship over the long run, we can determine that both 
countries act in accord with general deterrence theory. Historical changes to the status 
quo, as well as the most recent changes, show that both countries use deterrence in their 
strategic relationship. As actors in an antagonistic relationship, they react to the opposing 
actor’s force structure and policies, despite their belief that there is no military solution to 
their situation. Furthermore, both actors have likely internalized their deterrence based on 
norms that set mutually understood boundaries.   
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B.  HISTORY OF DETERRENCE THEORY 
The theory of deterrence used in this thesis is only the latest in what could be 
called four successive waves of deterrence theory.  The idea of waves of deterrence 
theory was first proposed by Robert Jervis in 1979, and again as recently as 2008 by 
Jeffrey Knopf.100  The first wave appeared immediately after World War II with the 
introduction of nuclear weapons and the possibility that they would prevent warfare.  In 
other words, nuclear weapons could deter all attacks, even conventional 
confrontations.101 The second wave was founded on the basis of the first as the United 
States institutionalized deterrence as a strategy, and theorists introduced intricate methods 
for evaluating deterrence.102 The third wave emerged in the 70s by questioning the 
usefulness of rational actor theory that deterrence depended upon.103 Strategic airpower 
theorists used this strategy to expand the inventory and capability of U.S. nuclear 
weapons. Other authors, such as Robert Jervis, questioned whether actors correctly 
interpreted language and rhetoric.104 By the early 1990s, deterrence would be discarded 
as a useful theory. But recently, there has been a reevaluation of deterrence theory.  This 
version is not as all-encompassing as previous renditions and is much more realistic. 
C.  DESCRIPTION OF DETERRENCE THEORY 
The fourth wave reintroduces deterrence theory by reevaluating deterrence in light 
of asymmetric relationships (e.g., vs. deterring terrorism). It applies the criticisms made 
of the third wave, using the constructivist and English School approaches, and creates a 
 
100 Robert Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” World Politics 31, 1979, 289–324; Jeffrey Knopf, 
The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Theory: A Critical Appraisal (2008); available from 
http://www.allacademic.com /meta/p279094_index.html; Internet; accessed 30 March, 2009. 
101 Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and Co, 1946). 
102 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). 
103 Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Scott, 
Foresman, 1971). 
104 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976). 
 43
                                                
norms-based concept of deterrence.105 In this perspective, deterrence is a boundary-
setting activity.  Sometimes these boundaries become the norms in a relationship because 
the actors internalize the norms and then will even predict each other’s probable 
responses and adjust their own strategy or actions accordingly.  
Fourth-wave deterrence theory has a norms-based foundation. In other words, 
deterrence encourages an expected pattern of behavior and serves as a boundary-setting 
activity, creating “the standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given 
identity.”106  Norms both set limits on and encourage certain types of behavior (constrain 
and enable) and also constitute how actors think about themselves. Evidence of norms 
recognized by both actors is the most important supporting variable for deterrence theory. 
Norms ultimately help anticipate the probable response of the opponent.   
There is a sort of deterrence far more regular than the sort that captures the most 
attention from policy-makers and academics. It occurs when one party makes a 
determined effort to dissuade another party from taking action judged harmful to its 
interests.  Freedman defines this as internalized deterrence.107  Internalized deterrence 
depends upon commonly agreed upon norms that allow each actor to consider the likely 
responses to any action taken. 
But deterrence is only one of several principles that manage the use of force. 
Morgan specifically points out that deterring terrorism requires considering other tools to 
exert influence.108  These tools range from preemption to consensual strategies, with 
deterrence as just one of them.  This allows deterrence theory to describe a relationship or 
possible future actions, rather than be an all-encompassing theory. 
The most common type of threat used is general deterrence, or implicit threat.109  
It is shaped by a number of factors, but focuses on the opponent’s force structure to 
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determine the severity of the threat.  This requires an assessment of the opponent’s 
capabilities and strategic environment.110  Freedman, along with others, concentrates on 
reputation, or how credible the response will be.  The possible severity of reprisal 
(capability) and the credibility of the response (reputation) play into how the other actor 
assesses its strategic environment. Freedman also points out that “conventional 
deterrence requires a demonstration of capability, while nuclear deterrence is more a 
matter of will.”111  Yet, just in the last decade, there has been a subtle shift in this with 
the introduction of ballistic missile defense.  For instance, it is now important to 
demonstrate the capability of not just a missile defense system, but also the penetration 
aids used to defeat it.  The force structure and resulting capability are the clearest signs of 
a general deterrence atmosphere. 
Successful general deterrence results in nothing much happening, but it is very 
obvious when it fails.  Immediate deterrence usually involves one actor disregarding 
threats or acting regardless of the threat.112 A failure in general deterrence involves an 
actor breaking a norm or a boundary established in the relationship.  The response will 
usually result in an iteration of immediate deterrence, where an actor feels it is necessary 
to threaten the use of force to maintain a new norm or boundary.113  Actors seem to be 
internally aware of the consequences and make decisions based on it.  
D.  GENERAL DETERRENCE AND THE SINO-JAPANESE 
RELATIONSHIP   
First, deterrence is only one aspect of the overall Sino-Japanese relationship.  
Nevertheless, deterrence can provide some insight into their interaction and provide a 
glimpse into their possible reasoning and future decision making within the relationship.  
Since there have been no explicit threats concerning the use of force, general deterrence 
is the relevant frame of reference. General deterrence would predict an enduring rivalry 
in which threats are implicitly made about the other’s force structure and the opponent’s 
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involvement with multiple parties, and where suspicions exist about the “real” reasons for 
domestic issues. Foreign policy will depict the other party as an adversary.114   
Both countries have made implicit threats regarding a number of issues, which 
include sovereignty issues in the East China Sea to improvements in the other’s military 
force, as well as their involvement with third parties (from North Korea to Taiwan and 
even the United States).  General deterrence must be assessed over the long term. Thus, a 
general deterrence relationship would encourage “norm setting” behavior with shifts in 
norms evident during changes of the international order or domestic revolution.115 
General deterrence would also predict that the Japanese and Chinese militaries 
would react to each other’s capabilities and continue to make public statements or evince 
concerns about the orientation of the other’s forces.116 Moreover, this orientation would 
continue until the status quo changed and immediate deterrence was required because one 
country had broken an established “norm” or stepped beyond an understood boundary.117 
Lawrence Freedman only mentions one such norm, nuclear weapons and the 
taboo of using them.  No country in the world takes the threat of the use of nuclear 
weapons more seriously than Japan.  China has made no threats to use nuclear weapons 
against Japan but is very careful to imply that U.S. bases in Japan that launch 
conventional attacks will suffer retaliation.118  Moreover, the number and orientation of 
Chinese nuclear weapons imply that at least some of them target Japan.  However, both 
countries realize the tremendous implications of using a nuclear weapon against Japan, 
and this seems to be one of the most basic norms in the relationship.  These implications 
also might contribute to the Chinese decision to use the minimum necessary nuclear force 
to demonstrate its strategic capabilities.  This would seem to imply the Chinese realize 
the psychological impact of using just a few nuclear weapons.119  There is an established 
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norm that says using nuclear weapons against Japan is more injurious than using it 
against other countries.120  At the base of the strategic relationship between Japan and 
China, there is a norm establishing the severity of using a nuclear weapon against Japan 
that helps determine the need for just a few weapons to successfully deter Japan.  This 
norm informs both countries’ decisions about their capabilities.  
The NPT has entrenched a norm against nuclear proliferation.   But, having 
proven that Japan is considered a “virtual” nuclear state, and that its leadership considers 
itself open to the nuclear option, the uniqueness of Japan’s position in terms of the 
international norm against proliferation should be noted. Japan became an advocate of the 
NPT as a response to China’s nuclear test in 1967. However, worry that other non-
signatories would opt out of the treaty, leaving Japan as a “second-tier” state, prompted a 
review of Japan’s nuclear options.121  Japan is less likely to “go nuclear” without major 
provocation because of the severe implications internationally, and more specifically the 
strong negative Chinese reaction.  However, the recent failures of the improvements 
proposed to the NPT in 2005, combined with the greater possibility of a Sino-Japanese 
conflict, and suspicions of the usefulness of U.S. extended deterrence have prompted new 
debates about the usefulness of a Japanese domestic deterrent.122  This would result most 
likely in immediate deterrence threats by the Chinese, or more likely an increase in 
weapon numbers or a change in strategy away from minimum deterrence.   
Nevertheless, Japan’s possible proliferation is also important for China’s military 
modernization.  An over-threatening nuclear posture by China could cause the very thing 
China is trying to prevent. China must realize the implications of excessively 
modernizing its nuclear or conventional forces because it could result in a U.S.–Japan 
arms race, as noted by Green or the nuclearization of Japan.123 The minor improvements 
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already made to China’s nuclear forces have resulted in increased debate in Japan 
concerning Japan’s nuclear option.124 An expansion of China’s nuclear inventory, or its 
abandonment of a minimal deterrence posture, could conceivably result in Japan’s 
development of a nuclear deterrent.  The result is the existence of a norm or unspoken 
agreement between China and Japan that any attempt on Japan’s part to “go nuclear” 
would result in a breaking of the norm and a disciplinary response by China.  It also 
results in a limit on how much China can modernize its nuclear forces without provoking 
a Japanese response. 
The inviolability of a state’s territory is one of the most basic norms of deterrence.  
Sovereignty informs many bilateral norms for China.  For instance, China has long held 
that third countries interfering in Taiwan will suffer retaliation.  In Japan’s case, this was 
illustrated in the 1996 review of the U.S.–Japan mutual defense treaty that added “areas 
surrounding Japan.” China responded quickly by condemning any Japanese interference 
in a Taiwan conflict. The recent disagreement over the Chunxiao oilfields and 
Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands are other examples of the seriousness with which both 
countries treat national sovereignty. In both cases, Japan and China have sent subtle hints 
reinforcing particular norms for their relationships concerning boundaries that should not 
be crossed.  Any attempt to break the norm or cross the boundary would result in 
disciplinary action.  In other words, both China and Japan have internalized the other’s 
“red lines” for this particular issue and resort to political posturing and force deployments 
instead of using specific deterrence statements and escalating the issue beyond one dealt 
within the bounds of a general deterrence relationship.  
Another deterrence norm unique to the Sino-Japanese relationship is Japan’s 
status as a “normal” country.  China views this as a change in the status quo and has 
reacted negatively to Japanese actions.  Although this is not a case of immediate 
deterrence, it does lend credence to the belief that China considers the norm to be a 
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forced China to reassess its capabilities and openly state that these changes will provoke 
changes in China’s military in reaction.  This is evidence that the principles of deterrence 
describe the Sino-Japanese relationship. 
A general uneasiness in the Sino-Japanese relationship has resulted from the 
deployment of a Japanese missile defense. The missile defense created an incentive for 
China to conduct a first strike before these defenses were completed.125   This is an 
example of how general deterrence could have failed and presented China with the option 
of using preemptive force.  Instead, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed the 
negative actions that would occur (missile buildup, etc.) if Japan completed the 
system.126 The Chinese recently warned Japan of a possible missile-defense-provoked 
arms race.127 Despite Japan’s new normal-state behavior, China is intent on identifying 
Japan with a reputation for militarism. 
The norms present in the Sino–Japanese relationship reflect a general deterrence 
atmosphere.  Both countries imply and subtly hint at boundaries for each other. The result 
is that over time, the other country internalizes the boundary and a norm is established.  
Neither country mentions the devastating impact that atomic weapons had on Japa,n and 
they do not need to—it is a mutually understood norm.  The same goes for the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and the norm establishing Japan’s status as a non-
nuclear power, as well as China’s restraint in developing a more robust nuclear arsenal.  
And, although the sovereignty issues and Japanese remilitarization are not related to the 
nuclear relationship, they do help describe commonly understood issues and the 
boundaries of each.  These long-established boundaries frame the conversation of both 
countries and shape the internal dialogue for decision making.  
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E.  MISSILE DEFENSE’S EFFECT ON DETERRENCE 
Missile defense may be the most effective security guarantee against China, and 
this makes it the worst development for deterrence between China and Japan.  Japan is 
close to completing a dual-layered missile defense. Although it cannot claim to be 100 
percent effective, testing and practice will ensure that its defensive capability improves 
with time. Moreover, Japan’s isolation by the sea and its cities’ small geographic 
footprint make it easier to defend than a larger country like the United States, or closely 
abutting its potential adversaries like India.128  Japanese missile defense raises the 
possibility that a Chinese attack could fail to significantly harm Japan. Right now, the 
Chinese seem to be convinced that their penetration aids and missile numbers will defeat 
Japanese missile defense.  But this is no guarantee of the future stability of the status quo.  
A decrease in Chinese nuclear capability reflects a decrease in Chinese ability to 
successfully deter the Japanese.  This possibility does not seem to have entered the 
Japanese calculus.  Missile defense has a negative affect on the deterrence relationship 
because while Japan is using it as a hedging strategy, it really strengthens Japan’s 
offensive posture.  
The missile defense system may be seen as a hedging strategy for Japan. In effect, 
the missile defense is “just-in-case” things deteriorate with China. It allows Japan to push 
aggressively for comprehensive security in every quarter.  Japan is expanding security 
cooperation with the United States, pursuing an independent missile defense, and 
simultaneously investing heavily commercially in China.129 The U.S. National 
Intelligence Council pointed out in 1999, “Japan is engaged in the most sophisticated 
hedging strategy, strengthening security ties to the U.S. while building independent 
capabilities.”130  Because they give the impression of a lack of commitment, the targets 
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of hedging strategies usually react negatively and this explains why the U.S. complained 
in this case.  China is worse off regardless of whether Japan moves close to the U.S. or 
develops more in the way of an indigenous capability. This hedging strategy injures 
Japan’s relationship with China while mitigating the risk of a Chinese threat without 
addressing it directly. 
The defensive orientation of missile defense only serves to strengthen Japan’s 
offensive orientation. There is little intention, from the Japanese perspective, of 
developing an offensive weapons system to take advantage of the greater defensive 
security of BMD.131   But China has on numerous occasions referred to Japan’s BMD as 
leading to a nuclear Japan or a more offensive force structure.132  The safety of a missile 
defense umbrella defeats the only real threat the Chinese can invoke against Japan.  From 
the Chinese perspective, there is less to deter the Japanese from remilitarizing, and the 
nuclear option is a greater concern.   
China is also worried Japan will develop nuclear weapons. Once a country erects 
an effective missile defense shield, nuclear weapons take on a more offensive role, 
severely affecting the offensive-defensive balance.   In the absence of missile defense, a 
new nuclear state must achieve three operational requirements—secure forces, second 
strike capability, and reliable command and control—for stable deterrence to emerge.133  
These three conditions are required because they decrease the incentive of a first strike. 
as well as the likelihood of accidental and unauthorized launches.  A capable missile 
defense system offers something of a second strike capability because it offers protection 
for offensive weapons.  And, as discussed in Chapter I, a missile defense system relies 
upon similar command and control procedures and practices as an offensive one.  From 
the Chinese deterrence perspective, missile defense is a threatening hedging investment.  
From Japan’s perspective, missile defense is a smart move given China’s recent 
aggressive spending on missile technology and increasing numbers of medium-range 
missiles. Japan’s investment in the possibility of a hostile future has created a self-
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fulfilling prophecy.  Japan’s hedging and perceived offensive posture works against 
deterrence by expressing doubt in the established norms in the Sino-Japanese 
relationship.  One of these norms is China’s perception of Japan’s identity. China has 
used numerous examples to identify Japan as an enemy and missile defense adds one 
more.134  Missile Defense has had a negative impact by increasing the possibility of 
Japan’s nuclear armament and had a detrimental impact on how both countries perceive 
Japan’s “normalization” and the associated social norms.  
F.  MILITARY MODERNIZATION EFFECT ON DETERRENCE 
For the Chinese, minimalism has been integral to the process of developing and 
maintaining a nuclear capability.  Chinese policymakers make decisions based on the 
underlying belief that the minimum essential capability is all that is needed for 
deterrence.135  U.S. and Japanese policymakers seemingly reject this view by 
concentrating on Chinese military modernization.  But the Chinese have a long way to go 
before they can challenge U.S. or Japanese military capability.  The nuclear 
modernization reforms boost Beijing’s confidence in its ability to control escalation.136 
In the Chinese view, modernization positively affects the deterrence relationship because 
China is using a strategy that enhances its own security at a slow enough pace not to 
threaten others.  
China looks at the longer term in maintaining its nuclear capability and only seeks 
to increase its capability to the minimum.  In the 1960s, only a few nuclear weapons were 
necessary. But as countries were added to the nuclear club, nuclear capabilities increased, 
and missile defense was accelerated, more and more nuclear weapons became necessary.  
In China’s present case, sustaining minimum deterrence means increasing its capability 
slightly.137  The Chinese method is to avoid an arms race by building confidence in  
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China’s deterrence strategy and not threatening anyone else’s security.  The goal is to 
seek norms that encourage a general atmosphere of deterrence in the Sino-Japanese 
relationship.  
China has also embraced international norms and security agreements that it 
shunned until recently.  After a century of humiliation by foreign powers, China became 
very sensitive to any sovereignty issues, and avoided signing international agreements 
that it felt impinged on its sovereignty.  But China has recently shifted from being a “part 
of the problem” to “part of the solution,” by making international agreements that relate 
to security.138  In 1996, China signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 
which limits it from testing nuclear weapons that would have complicated the 
development of next-generation warheads.  It has taken a more active stance on 
nonproliferation by instituting safeguards and promoting policies that prevent the spread 
of nuclear weapons.  It has also organized and hosted five rounds of Six Party Talks to 
prevent North Korea from adding to the proliferation problem.  This active stance on 
nonproliferation minimizes the skepticism and unease with which the established powers 
view China.139  The dedication that China has invested in international norms is 
illustrated by China’s willingness to support and abide by treaties like the CBTB, despite 
neither the U.S. nor China ratifying them.   
China’s objective is to deter an American nuclear attack but also implicitly deter 
the Japanese from developing nuclear weapons and remilitarizing.  China seeks to 
accomplish this in two ways: First, through an expansion of its missile capability to 
include a BMD-defeating capability.140  This requires that China field this capability at a 
rate that does not provide Japan with a reason to “go nuclear,” or an excuse for an even 
larger or more capable missile defense.  Second, China is encouraging norm building 
between China and Japan that reinforces China’s sovereignty, discusses Japan’s 
remilitarization, and avoids proliferation. 
 
138 Shulong Chu and Rong Yu, “China: Dynamic Minimum Deterrence,” in The Long Shadow: 
Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2008), 161–187. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Brad Roberts, “Alternative Futures,” in China’s Nuclear Future, ed Paul J. Bolt and Albert S. 
Willner (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 174. 
 53
G.  WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS 
China is the primary security concern for Japan.  Although there are other 
concerns, North Korea cannot be dealt with on its own, and Russia has not dedicated 
resources to the East and does not seem likely to in the future.  For the short term, the 
principal security threat for Japan is China. For China, Japan is the primary security 
concern among Asian countries.  Japan is not a nuclear weapons state and China hopes to 
keep it that way by embracing a minimum deterrence posture.  However, recent changes 
in Japan’s military, including the addition of missile defense, have resulted in 
improvements to China’s nuclear forces.   
The Chinese threat drives the Japanese security environment. But this threat will 
not be resolved without more forthcoming exchanges between China and Japan, beyond 
the economic exchanges occurring currently. Security meetings between both sides are 
important in order to change current perceptions. Japan must be willing to accommodate 
China’s concerns about Japan’s pseudo-nationalism, and cooperate with China for a more 
stable northeast Asia. The current situation cannot be reversed, but steps can be taken to 
reduce tensions by clearly delineating missile numbers and orientation. Just as the United 
States and the Russia have decreased tensions, China and Japan must recognize the 
similarities in their own situation and prevent the current spiral from continuing. 
The worry is that China will not be able to deter Japan from becoming a nuclear 
state or, even more frightening, from using such nuclear weapons against China. The only 
option for the PRC is to create doubt in the effectiveness of a BMD system through 
missile defense-defeating technology, or an increase in the number of missiles. This 
reintroduces vulnerability in the Japanese and U.S. systems. Of course, by believing in 
these technologies so blindly, China may also be deluding itself concerning its actual 
capabilities. The more aggressive nuclear posture indicates the uneasiness with which 
China sees the international environment from a strategic nuclear standpoint. 
Some intelligent speculation can be proposed about the future interaction of Japan 
and China.  Displays of Chinese and Japanese missile technology will continue into the 
future but, without an external event, Japanese nuclear weapon development is unlikely. 
Japan’s preferred nuclear capability will consist of ballistic missile submarines because 
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the Japanese people are vehemently opposed to the presence of nuclear weapons on their 
home territory and, from a strategic cultural aspect, the Japanese have preferred to defend 
their islands from the ocean.  The Ryukyu Island chain offers an excellent defensive 
structure against any sort of undersea warfare by the Chinese, and the Japanese Islands 
have ready access to the deep ocean. 
The Chinese, for their part, have clearly laid out in advance their intention to 
modernize their nuclear forces, to ensure that they can defeat ballistic missile defenses to 
maintain a deterrent, secure their second strike capability, and maintain their policy of 
minimum deterrence and no first use.  China would obviously react to a Japanese nuclear 
weapon with apprehension, since Beijing is its only logical target, and they would adjust 
with either a greater nuclear arsenal or a change in policy. 
The most important sovereignty issue for China is Taiwan. Taiwan’s 
independence is inextricably related to China’s fear of Japan’s resurgent militarism.  
Taiwan’s separation reminds the mainland of a century of humiliation and Japanese 
colonialism. Taiwan acts as a strong reminder to China of Japan’s colonial period, 
through the close unofficial relationship Japan has with Taiwan and its Democratic 
Progressive Party. China is primarily concerned with Japan defending Taiwan by missile 
defense. Although Japan could deploy Aegis destroyers to the Taiwanese Strait, this 
move would leave Japan dangerously vulnerable. The ships might also be outside Japan’s 
radar-defense network. Therefore they would be more vulnerable, and as a result Japan 
would be less likely to sacrifice them. The PAC-3 missile batteries are not easily mobile 
across water, which is why China largely accepts this tier of Japanese missile defense, 
although there are new fears regarding Japanese export of domestically produced PAC-3 
missiles to Taiwan. However, this would not be practical as a crisis response for the 
defense of Taiwan. In contrast, Japan’s SM-3 could be deployed within days of a crisis. A 
stable general deterrence relationship is required to prevent Japan from crossing this line.  
China’s nuclear future is tempered by its strategic outlook and mostly by reactions 
to outside influences.  Although the United States is the primary driver for China’s 
security concerns, Japan has an impact as well. China’s likely current plan to slowly 
increase its nuclear capability to meet Japanese increases in missile defense can be 
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contained through dialogue committed to concentrating on China’s “peaceful rise” and 
encouraging international norms.  On the other hand, if China disregards other countries’ 
perceptions of it, and rapidly increases it capability to challenge or “balance” the United 
States or Japan, then an arms race that China wants to avoid could result. 
Japan’s security is a controllable issue, if Japan can resolve the disputes it has 
with China.  Japan also has two choices: it can acknowledge the sensitivities that other 
countries have concerning its forces’ orientation, and work through dialogue or 
agreements to reassure others, or it can disregard others’ perceptions of its security 
posture and continue to encourage xenophobic public opinion.  Japan must ultimately 
become a more “normal” country with regard to security, but this does not mean that 
Japan’s security should come first.  Like China, its security lies less with new military 
capabilities and more with restraints on sovereignty through international norms and 
agreements.   
H.  CONCLUSION 
The relationship between China and Japan is institutionalized antagonism. 
Although both countries recognize that they cannot solve their problem militarily, they 
assess each other’s military force structure and respond accordingly.  This relationship 
will result in a stable military antagonism over the long term. Future studies should look 
at the possibility of a permanent, enduring rivalry in a mature phase consisting of a stable 
antagonism punctuated by disputes and crises.141 Many of the indicators and facts 
established in this thesis also suggest a renewed rivalry between China and Japan 
extending across all security issues. The result may be a dangerous situation that, if not 
properly recognized, may end in either war or a peaceful resolution of contentious issues. 
The Sino–Japanese nuclear relationship has been a successful case study for 
fourth-wave deterrence theory, and also reveals the structure of the relationship based on 
capability and strategy. China realizes the constructive value of deterrence, but Japan 
does not seem to realize its capability against China, or the value of the norms structuring 
 
141 Claudia Cioff-Revilla, “The Political Uncertainty of Interstate Rivalries: A Punctuated Equilibrium 
Model,” in The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries, ed. Paul F. Diehl.  (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1998) 
64–97. 
 56
                                                
the relationship.  Although nations should not seek out a general deterrence relationship, 
it is the least dangerous in the near term and can be corrected once the issues underlying 
the security postures are recognized, discussed, and efforts are made to solve them.  
Unfortunately for the Sino-Japanese relationship, this is easier said than done.  The 
pattern of almost 100 years of an antagonistic relationship punctuated by brief periods of 
conciliation is hard to break. Cioffa-Revilla points out that enduring rivalries, like the 
Sino-Japanese, most often end with some conflict.142 Future studies should analyze 
norms and internal deterrence for long-lasting rivalries and may usefully illuminate the 
underlying issues for resolution.  Lawrence Freedman’s theoretical framework provides 
the basis for illuminating the problem issues.  As a result, policy makers can use 
deterrence theory for establishing the basis for engagement strategies and conflict 
resolution.     
One final observation: as an officer with an operational expertise in nuclear 
deterrence and as a student of strategic deterrence, I find that the connection between 
operational capability and nuclear strategy is difficult to implement.  It requires a clear 
mission statement from commanders and policy makers to ensure that nuclear warfare is 
not treated as a serious possibility, but that strategy managers nevertheless clearly 
understand the impact that capability has on ideas like general deterrence and internalized 
deterrence.  This is something that seems to be understood by the Chinese 2nd artillery, 
but Japan’s military has yet to grasp the implications of missile defense at a strategic 
level.  If Japan were not so close to developing a nuclear deterrent, this would be a 
nonissue, but as it stands, this gives missile defense added value at the strategic level.  
The Japanese military should continue to concentrate on improving operational concepts, 
implementation and execution but should also concentrate some attention on the strategic 
level. 
 
142 Claudia Cioff-Revilla, “The Political Uncertainty of Interstate Rivalries: A Punctuated Equilibrium 
Model,” in The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries, ed. Paul F. Diehl.  (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1998) 
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